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Chevron as a Voting Rule 
 
Jacob E. Gersen* 
Adrian Vermeule** 
 
 Of central importance to administrative law and theory is the question whether, 
and when, courts will defer to agency interpretations of law.  In Chevron v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council,1 the Supreme Court replaced earlier answers to that question 
with a new framework: courts should defer to an agency interpretation unless the relevant 
statute is clear or the agency interpretation is unreasonable.  In the past two decades, 
however, the Chevron framework has come under increasing strain.  Doctrinally, there 
are many ambiguities and uncertainties about the nature of the inquiry at the first and 
second steps of Chevron, including questions about the admissibility and weight of 
various legal sources;2 more recently, the Mead decision3 and its successors have 
produced added complexity, and some confusion, by requiring an elaborate legal inquiry 
to determine whether Chevron applies in the first place.4  In practice, recent evidence 
suggests that Chevron has increased overall deference to agencies, but also that 
Chevron’s effect varies markedly with the ideological and political preferences of the 
judges who apply it.5     
 In what follows, we will suggest that these problems arise, in part, from a dubious 
premise of the Chevron enterprise, one that should be rethought.  The dubious premise is 
that the legal system should adopt a doctrinal solution—the Chevron rule— for what is, 
after all, an institutional problem: the allocation of interpretive authority between 
agencies and courts when congressional instructions are silent or ambiguous.  We explore 
an alternative, which is to adopt an institutional solution to the institutional problem.  The 
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** Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.  We thank to Eric Posner, Elizabeth 
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1 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
2 For an overview of the doctrinal puzzles, see STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
REGULATORY POLICY 319-413 (5th ed. 2002). 
3 United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
4 See Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 347 (2003). See also Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457 
(2005). 
5 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2006);  Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine, 107 
YALE L. J. 2155 (1998);   Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
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institutional solution is to cast Chevron as a voting rule, thereby institutionalizing 
deference to administrative agencies.  The precise details of the voting rule might vary, 
and we will discuss different versions.  To motivate the discussion, however, imagine a 
voting rule stating that where a litigant challenges agency action as inconsistent with an 
organic statute, the agency would prevail unless the judges, asking simply what the best 
interpretation of the statute is, vote to overturn the agency by supermajority vote—say, 
by a 6-3 vote on the Supreme Court, or by a 3-0 vote on a court of appeals panel. 
 Our thesis is that a voting rule of this sort would capture the benefits of the 
doctrinal version of Chevron while generating fewer costs.  In the doctrinal version, 
judges must develop and internalize a legal distinction between the best interpretation of 
the statute and a reasonable interpretation of the statute.  For conceptual, psychological 
and motivational reasons, this distinction is tenuous, even unstable.  This should be 
unsurprising; the doctrinal solution requires judges to internalize a legal norm of 
deference, but it is accompanied by none of the traditional mechanisms law uses to force 
decisionmakers to internalize the consequences of their choices.  Conversely, the 
principal advantage of institutionalizing Chevron as a voting rule is that it makes agency 
deference an aggregate property that arises from the whole set of votes, rather than an 
internal component of the decision-rules used by individual judges.  Casting Chevron as a 
voting rule has other benefits as well.  A voting-rule version of Chevron would allow 
more precise calibration of the level of judicial deference over time; and holding the level 
of deference constant, a voting rule of agency deference would produce less variance in 
deference across courts and over time, yielding a lower level of legal uncertainty than 
does the doctrinal version of Chevron.     
 We begin, in Part I, by laying out a distinction between legal doctrine and 
institutional rules.  Part II explains the benefits of casting Chevron as a voting rule, while 
Part III examines the costs.  Part II suggests that recasting Chevron as a voting rule would 
produce three major benefits: it would make agency deference an aggregate property of a 
multimember panel’s vote rather than a legal norm to be internalized by individual 
judges; it would allow more precise calibration of the level of agency deference, and 
greater fine-tuning of the areas in which deference is to apply; and it would reduce the 
legal uncertainty that currently arises from the complexities of the Chevron framework.  
Part III turns to the cost side.  We examine objections based on May’s Theorem and the 
Jury Theorem; the problems of single-member courts; the uncertainty of the voting rule’s 
triggering conditions; the effects of judicial precedent on agency flexibility; the costs of 
decisionmaking; the possibility of strategic behavior; the loss of positive byproducts of 
the doctrinal solution; and on the unlikelihood that any institution would supply such a 
rule.  Many of these objections, however, apply with equal force to the doctrinal version 
of Chevron; the rest are unpersuasive or irrelevant on their own terms.  A brief 
conclusion follows. 
I.  LEGAL DOCTRINE AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
A.  Problems, Soft Solutions and Hard Solutions 
 In many domains, legal doctrine is developed by judges, lawyers, and 
commentators with a view to solving an institutional problem—for example, the 
allocation of power across different institutions or among different officials within the 
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same institution.  Thus the presumption of constitutionality for legislation allocates a 
measure of interpretive authority over the Constitution to legislatures;6 the “clear error” 
standard of review allocates fact-finding competence to trial courts;7 and the legal norm 
of precedent or stare decisis allocates decision-making authority from present judges to 
past judges, whose views will control the judgment of the present on some questions.  
 Lawyers, however, frequently overlook the possibility that legal doctrine is rarely 
the only type of solution to an institutional problem, and may not always be the best 
solution.  An alternative is to change the rules that govern the composition, powers, or 
voting rules of the relevant institutions.  We call these “hard” solutions, in contrast to 
“soft” doctrinal solutions.  The relative costs and benefits of soft solutions, on the one 
hand, and hard solutions, on the other, vary across contexts and over time.  Our point is 
not that hard solutions are always superior, for they are not.  What we do suggest is that 
hard solutions prove superior in many domains, yet are frequently overlooked by lawyers. 
 Consider some examples of legal problems where there is an important choice 
between soft and hard solutions.  For manageability, and to hew closely to the Chevron 
issue, we confine ourselves to the choice between legal doctrine and voting rules, rather 
than other sorts of hard solutions. 
 1. Deference to legislatures.   
 The presumption of constitutionality for legislation, according to which courts 
should uphold legislation if there is a reasonable argument for constitutionality, was 
advocated by James Bradley Thayer and many later judges and commentators, including 
Holmes, Hand, and Frankfurter.8    The strength of the presumption, however, has waxed 
and waned over the course of American constitutional history.  Today, many believe that 
the presumption has withered away, particularly in certain contexts.9  A hard alternative 
periodically surfaces in the form of proposals that the Supreme Court, and perhaps lower 
courts, should (be required to) use a supermajority rule to invalidate statutes on 
constitutional grounds.10  A voting rule of this sort builds Thayerian deference into 
judicial decision-making at the aggregate level of the whole court, rather than urging 
individual Justices or judges to internalize deference as a legal norm. 
                                                 
6  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).  
7  For a recent overview of the “clear error” standard and related issues, see Randall H. Warner, All Mixed 
Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101 (2005).  
8 See Thayer, supra note; Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1, 26-27 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 661-62 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 56-57 (1958); see also Gerald Gunther, 
LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 118-19 (1994).  See generally Wallace Mendelson, The 
Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71 
(1978).  
9 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704-05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
10  Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule, 78 IND. 
L. J. 73 (2003); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule:  Reviving Consensus and Deference on the 
Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003). 
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 2.  Precedent.   
 Just as judges might defer to legislatures where there is reasonable doubt about 
the legal issues, so too judges might and do defer to past judges, where there is 
reasonable doubt about the legal issues.  The doctrine of stare decisis has many 
formulations and complexities, but a simple version requires judges to follow horizontal 
precedent—the previous decisions of the same court—unless the precedent is “clearly 
erroneous.”11  This is a soft solution; a hard alternative would be to say that the precedent 
decision must be followed unless overruled by a supermajority vote or even a unanimous 
vote of the later court.   
 3. The Rule of Four.   
 The previous examples involved legal norms that have been embodied in doctrine, 
but that might also be embodied in voting rules, with a different set of costs and benefits.  
Here we provide the converse example: a voting rule that might be recast as a legal 
doctrine.  Consider the Rule of Four, according to which the votes of any four of the nine 
Justices of the Supreme Court are sufficient to grant certiorari for a full hearing on the 
merits of a case.12  A soft analogue of the Rule of Four would be an ordinary majority 
vote on the decision to grant certiorari, accompanied by an internalized legal norm that 
Justices would follow in casting their individual votes.13  The content of the internalized 
norm might be something along the following lines: Justices should vote for certiorari if a 
reasonable Justice could believe that the petition warrants a full hearing.  Whatever its 
precise content, the internalized norm might yield roughly the same number of certiorari 
grants, all else equal, as a nonmajority voting rule under which each Justice directly asks 
whether, in his or her judgment, the Court’s criteria for granting certiorari are satisfied.  
 4. Appointments and senatorial deference.   
 So far the examples have focused on courts, but the distinction between hard and 
soft rules is relevant to other institutional contexts as well.  Doctrinal norms exist outside 
of courts; many institutions have more-or-less explicit or articulate systems of precedent 
and more-or-less canonical verbal formulations of norms that are embodied in the 
institution’s past decisions.  Consider the view, advanced by many Senators of both 
parties at many times, that Senators should give some degree of deference to the 
President’s appointments, especially for executive offices but for judges as well.14  The 
level of deference is hard to capture in any single verbal formula, but many Senators say 
something to the effect that they will defer unless a nominee is “clearly” unsuitable.  
More recently, a decisive fraction of the Senate—the Gang of Fourteen—agreed to defeat 
                                                 
11 See, e.g.,  Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(divergence from precedent justified where prior judgment was “egregiously incorrect.”). 
12 See generally Richard L. Revesz & Parmela S. Karlan, Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 
U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1988).  
13 Cf. Margaret M. Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 389, 418-20 (2004). 
14 See generally David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process, 101 YALE L. J. 1491 (1992).   
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filibusters unless “extraordinary circumstances” exist.15  One might imagine a system of 
presidential appointments that embodied these ideas in a hard voting rule, something like 
a reverse filibuster: unless a supermajority votes to defeat a nominee, the appointment 
will be deemed to have been confirmed.  It is hardly clear that such a rule would be 
constitutional, because the best reading of the Advise and Consent Clause might be that 
an affirmative majority vote is necessary to approve a nominee (whether or not it is 
sufficient to do so).  For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the hard solution would 
indeed be constitutionally permissible; as a conceptual matter it is an entirely viable 
alternative to the soft norm of deference to the President.16  
 These examples could easily be multiplied.  The central point is that the bare 
specification of a problem in the legal system does not entail that the solution should be 
doctrinal, rather than institutional in a hard sense.  Lawyers frequently overlook this 
choice among solutions, perhaps because their training focuses on legal doctrine and 
because some hard solutions can only be supplied by nonjudicial institutions—as when a 
statute or constitutional amendment is necessary to change voting rules.  We return to the 
supply-side issues in Part III. As a general matter, hard solutions are not the dominant 
solution, but they are not rare either.  
B.  General Tradeoffs 
 With these examples in hand, we are in a position to say something about  the 
general tradeoffs that determine the choice between soft and hard solutions.  Here we 
indicate some frequently encountered variables, together with a rough estimate of their 
signs.  The magnitudes of the relevant variables, however, will differ greatly across 
contexts, and in many contexts there will be special considerations that do not generalize.  
These qualifications notwithstanding, there are regularities that make some tentative 
generalizations possible. 
 1.  Aggregate norms versus individual norms.   
 Consider the problem of partial deference, by which we mean the recurring 
situation in which it would be good or right for institution A to defer to institution B but 
only if institution B’s decision is not clearly wrong or unreasonable.  Institution A might 
be a court, and institution B an agency (or a legislature); A might be a higher court, and B 
a lower court; and so on.  We bracket, for now, the question why deference would be 
good or right in this situation; our focus is on the choice between means for attaining a 
posited goal, not on the theory that makes the goal desirable.  We also assume that 
institution A is a multimember decisionmaking body, such as an appellate court.  Single-
                                                 
15 Charles Babington & Susan Schmidt, Filibuster Deal Puts Democrats in a Bind; Pact May Hinder 
Efforts To Block High Court Nominee, WASH. POST. (July 4, 2005), at A1; Charles Babington & Shailagh 
Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST. (May 24, 2005), at A1.  
16 As another suggestive example, in Congress the floor  gives a soft form of deference to the proposing 
committee.  See Daniel Diermeier, Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions, 89 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 344 (1995); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987).  
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member bodies like district courts present distinct problems; in any event, single-member 
bodies rarely make final decisions in our legal system.17  
 A problem that arises in many situations of partial deference  is that the triggering 
conditions for deference are vague or imprecise.  What is “clear” or “unreasonable” to 
one judge is not “clear” or “unreasonable” to another.  Conceptually, it is not clear what 
“clear” means.  Psychologically, it is difficult for judges and other decisionmakers to 
avoid collapsing their conception of a “reasonable” legal answer into their conception of 
the best legal answer, thereby defining all second-best answers as unreasonable.  
Motivationally, deference rules based on vague triggering conditions allow scope for 
ideological and even partisan biases.  We return to these points below, with specific 
illustrations from administrative law.  The basic problem in such cases is that individual 
decisionmakers are charged with internalizing a legal norm of deference that is 
conceptually ill-defined and that cuts against both their individual judgments of what is 
best and their biases and prejudices.  And this duty of internalization is not aided by any 
of the usual mechanisms by which law encourages or forces actors to internalize legal 
rules, principally material rewards or penalties.  The rewards and sanctions that affect 
judicial behavior are weak, second-order forces like professional reputation.18  Of course 
legal doctrine requires judges to internalize norms in many settings; but the burden of 
internalization is especially heavy in those cases in which judges are required to make 
second-order judgments about deference, as we illustrate below.  
 A shift from a soft legal norm to a hard institutional solution would solve these 
problems.  Imagine a supermajority voting rule under which institution A defers to 
institution B unless two-thirds of the members of A believe that B is wrong on the merits.  
Each decisionmaker asks simply what legal answer is best and votes accordingly.  
Deference is an emergent property of the aggregate vote, rather than of individual 
decisions.  Conceptually, there is no need for  decisionmakers to develop a theory about 
what counts as a “clear” (as opposed to merely correct or incorrect) legal answer.  
Psychologically, there is no requirement  that the decisionmaker simultaneously hold in 
her mind two conflicting legal standards, so the cognitive load is greatly reduced.  
Motivationally, each judge may be biased or prejudiced in some sense, yet assuming 
some diversity of preferences the biases will be washed out at the aggregate level, with 
deference enforced by the voting rule.  Moreover, it is easier for voters or other principals 
to monitor the behavior of their agents, the decisionmakers in institution A, because those 
agents have less room to maneuver in a supermajority voting rule system.  Rather than 
concealing their biased votes by claiming   that institution B’s decision is or is not clearly 
wrong or unreasonable—claims whose second-order character makes them inherently 
costly for outside observers to evaluate—the decisionmaker must now simply state his or 
                                                 
17 We discuss the problem of district courts at greater length in Part III, infra.  For a useful  if somewhat 
dated discussion of district court resolution of administrative law questions, see generally David P. Currie 
& Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Administrative Action:  Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975).     
18 See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 
U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000); Clayton P. Gillette, The Path of Law Today:  Lock-in Effects in Law and 
Norms, 78 B.U.L. REV. 813, 825-26 (1998);  Ronald A. Cass, Judging:  Norms and Incentives of 
Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 970-72 (1995); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges 
and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5-6 (1993).  
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her understanding of the correct legal answer.  There is one less degree of freedom for 
bias to operate. 
 These points abstract from the level of deference that actually results from either 
the soft or hard solution.  It is an empirical question whether or not a 6-3 supermajority 
rule, on a nine-member court, produces more, less, or the same level of deference as an 
internalized legal norm of deference.  Holding the level of deference constant, our 
suggestion is that a shift from deference as an internalized norm to deference as an 
aggregate property can produce a given level of deference at lower total cost to 
decisionmakers themselves and to other actors in the system.    
 2. Calibration versus fuzziness.   
 Suppose, in operation, that an internalized norm of deference produces too much 
or too little deference from institution A to institution B, with “too much” or “too little” 
defined by some extrinsic theory.  How can the level of deference be adjusted up or 
down?  If a soft solution is in place, adjustment is difficult and imprecise.  The problem is 
that verbal formulae are typically too crude to capture the fine shades of difference that 
are needed to tweak deference rules in either direction.  As Judge Posner suggests, “the 
cognitive limitations that judges share with mere mortals may constitute an insuperable 
obstacle to making distinctions any fine than that of plenary versus deferential review.”19  
Legal language can capture the idea of the best legal answer, and can indicate the idea of 
deference where decisions under review are not clearly erroneous, subject to the 
problems we have discussed. More fine-grained standards of deference, however, are 
difficult to express; cognitive capacities are typically inadequate to sustain a fine-grained 
schema of deference standards.20 Administrative law is replete with arguments about the 
possible differences between different standards of review, such as clear error, substantial 
evidence, and so on.  Such arguments are interminable and, for the most part, 
unilluminating.  These crude attempts at distinction often collapse in practice,21 as we 
will illustrate in detail below.   
 A voting rule can be more precisely calibrated.  If a 6-3 supermajority rule 
produces too little deference, a 7-2 rule can be substituted.  If a submajority rule such as 
the Rule of Four produces too few grants of certiorari, a Rule of Three might be adopted 
instead.  The calibration will still be imperfect, because the voting rules are still slightly 
lumpy; perhaps the optimal level of deference, according to the extrinsic theory, lies just 
in between the level produced by a 6-3 rule and that produced by a 7-2 rule.  
Comparatively, however, adjustments in voting rules will be less lumpy, and more fine-
grained, than slight manipulations in the wording of judicial doctrine.  
 3. Certainty versus variance.  
 A corollary of the last point is that hard solutions increase legal certainty. Suppose 
that a particular doctrinal formulation produces a particular level of deference, D.  This 
level, D, is a kind of expected value, with variance around that value; some courts 
applying the doctrine will exceed D; some will fall short; and some courts will exceed D 
                                                 
19 School District of Wisconsin Dells v. Z.S. Littlegorge, 295 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2002). 
20 United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring). 
21 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 
679 (2002). 
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in one period while falling short in another period.  A voting rule will produce greater 
certainty about deference, holding the expected level of deference constant.  To the extent 
that reducing variance is a benefit for actors in the legal system, a voting rule may well be 
preferable to a doctrinal solution. 
 In part, this is a result of the calibration point.  If the category of deference is 
broad, individual judges will likely select different deference points within the broad 
category.  Variation in individual-level deference translates into confusion about the 
overall level of deference.  By making deference a characteristic of the aggregation 
mechanism, the voting rule removes this source of uncertainty.  Beyond the calibration 
point, so long as a voting rule that builds in deference is more difficult for biased judges 
to thwart, there will be greater certainty that deference will be applied.  For reasons 
relating to clarity, predictability, and stability, the voting rule generates greater certainty.   
 
II.  CHEVRON AS A VOTING RULE 
 So far we have proceeded abstractly.  We now turn to Chevron, its problems, and 
the choice between hard and soft solutions.  Section A sets out the basics of Chevron’s 
doctrine and rationales, explains that Chevron’s most distinctive innovation, relative to 
the pre-Chevron law, is to require judges to develop a theory of permissible interpretation 
rather than to choose the best interpretation, and sets out the possible deference regimes 
that we will compare.  Section B examines three benefits of aggregating  judgments 
through a voting rule. A voting rule sidesteps conceptual problems that arise under the 
doctrinal version of Chevron, ameliorates the psychological difficulties of Chevron 
deference, and reduces the scope for political or ideological bias.  Sections C and D 
discuss calibration and certainty, respectively. 
A.  Chevron Rudiments  
 1. Rules and rationales.   
Chevron sets out a framework for judicial review of agencies’ statutory 
interpretations.  At Step One of Chevron, judges ask whether the statute speaks to the 
“precise question at issue”; if so, then the judges simply enforce its commands.22  If the 
statute contains a gap—if, in other words, it is silent or ambiguous on the relevant 
question—then judges are to proceed to Step Two, at which they ask whether the agency 
interpretation of the statute is “reasonable,” or, in other words, whether the agency 
interpretation falls within the scope of the statute’s ambiguity.23  
 Chevron’s theoretical rationale is unclear.  In the important Mead decision,24 the 
Court, following preexisting commentary,25 suggested that Chevron rests on Congress’s 
                                                 
22 There are many subtle problems about Step One, which we do not attempt to review here.  For a 
comprehensive treatment, see Elizabeth Garrett, “Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council,” in A Guide to Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies (American Bar Association 
2005) (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz, eds.). 
23 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.  
24 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
25 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain,  89 GEO. L. J. 833 (2001).  
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implicit delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies.  In this view, Chevron’s 
global default rule—namely, that statutory silence or ambiguity confers law-interpreting 
authority on agencies—derives from an implicit general instruction by Congress.  As 
both Justices and commentators have noted, however, this rationale is a fiction.26  The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is the nearest Congress has come to 
providing a general instruction on the allocation of law-interpreting authority, says that 
courts are to decide all relevant questions of law.27  
 Some scholars argue that deference to agencies is itself among the legal rules that 
courts are to apply.28 Even if true, that argument still provides no affirmative evidence 
whatsoever that Congress intended the APA as a general meta-instruction on the 
delegation of law-interpreting authority.29  The implied-delegation rationale for Chevron 
risks treating Congress as a ventriloquist’s dummy, into whose mouth may be inserted 
whatever fictional legal meta-instructions are necessary to square agency deference with 
the conviction that courts must say what the law is.  
 The Chevron opinion itself did not adopt this approach.  In a crucial passage, the 
Court explicitly rejected the idea that statutory gaps necessarily represent a congressional 
meta-instruction to delegate law-interpreting authority to the agency: 
Congress intended to accommodate both [economic and environmental interests], 
but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases.  Perhaps 
that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, 
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply 
did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to 
forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to 
take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.  For judicial purposes, it 
matters not which of these things occurred.30   
On this picture, a congressional meta-instruction might exist (as in the first scenario the 
Court gives), but it might not (as in the second or third scenarios), and the issue whether 
it does exist lacks the paramount importance that later commentators have tried to give 
it.31  The real basis for agency deference, according to the Chevron opinion itself, was not 
an implicit congressional meta-instruction, but a candid recognition, by judges, of the 
limits of their own institutional capacities.  “Judges are not experts in the field, and are 
                                                 
26 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 
517. 
27 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law . . . .”).   
28 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1983). 
29 The claim we critique in the text is made by Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983). We bracket here the claim that a well-understood legal convention, which 
later vanished from view, made a statutory grant of rulemaking authority equivalent to a delegation of 
authority to agencies to make rules with the force of law, and thus gave agencies law-interpreting authority.  
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
462 (2002).  
30 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (emphasis added).  
31 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001).  
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not part of either political branch of government.”32  Agencies’ superior expertise and 
political accountability better position them to fill statutory gaps.   
 It is sometimes said that these two components of Chevron’s real rationale are in 
tension with each other, because political accountability distorts expertise, but this 
overlooks two points.  First, where statutes contain gaps, the executive may pursue either 
a technocratic course or a political one; on the logic of Chevron, either approach is 
permissible.33  Second, Chevron’s claim is a strictly comparative one about the relative 
institutional capacities of agencies and courts.  By analogy, even if speed and power trade 
off against one another at the outer margins of athletic performance, still one baseball 
player might be both speedier and more powerful than another.  So too, even if there is a 
marginal tradeoff between expertise and political accountability, agencies might be both 
systematically more expert and systematically more accountable than are generalist 
judges. 
2. Permissible interpretations and best  readings.   
For present purposes, the most important feature of Chevron is that — in the 
doctrinal version — it requires individual judges to develop a theory of reasonable or 
permissible interpretation, distinct from the judge’s theory of what interpretation is best.  
Under pre-Chevron doctrine, many decisions suggested that the judicial task is to identify 
the statute’s “true meaning” or “best reading.”34  This is the standard conception of the 
judicial task where no agency is in the picture, or where the relevant agency does not 
receive deference at all — as in criminal cases, in which the nominal rule is that judges 
do not defer to prosecutors’ legal interpretations.  To be sure, judges seeking the best 
legal answer might take agency interpretations or prosecutorial interpretations as 
persuasive guidance, depending upon the agency’s accumulated experience, “the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”35  Yet in principle at least, these are just helpful 
pointers to the best interpretation.  
 Chevron departs from this baseline in a crucial respect.  Under the doctrinal 
version of Chevron, the judge must be able to say or think, in some set of cases, that the 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is “reasonable” or “permissible,” even though it is not 
the one the judge herself would deem best, were law-interpreting authority to be 
exercised by the court de novo.  The judges must, in effect, add to her first-order theory 
of statutory interpretation a second-order theory that identifies some first-order 
interpretations as reasonable, whether or not correct.   
 The point of this innovation is to open up space for discretionary policy 
judgments by agencies.  Chevron doctrine does this by distinguishing between the 
judges’ views about the statute’s best reading, on the one hand, and a range of 
permissible agency interpretations, on the other.  Instead of an interpretation that is a 
                                                 
32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
33 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Power of the President To Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming 2006).   
34 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).  
35 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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“point estimate,” Chevron aims to open up a “policy space” that gives agencies breathing 
room to pursue policies based on technocratic judgments or democratic politics.36  We 
will take this goal as given, putting aside root-and-branch criticisms of Chevron based on 
the separation of powers.37  Chevron’s second-order approach to interpretation, however, 
has proven problematic on conceptual, psychological and motivational grounds, or so we 
will suggest below.  Our basic claim is that there is a better way to achieve Chevron’s 
goals.  Agencies should be given breathing room by means of voting rules rather than 
legal doctrine. 
 Chevron’s requirement for a theory of permissible interpretation, as distinct from 
a theory of the best interpretation, implicates  Step One of Chevron as well as at Step 
Two.  At Step One, the logic of Chevron does not permit the judge simply to ask what the 
best interpretation of the statute is, by his or her lights, and then pronounce the statute 
“clear.”  (To be sure, some decisions do seem to adopt this course, as we will see; but 
these are failures of the Chevron framework, not examples of its successful operation).  
Rather, the Step One inquiry asks whether the agency interpretation, even if not the one 
the judge would deem best in a de novo consideration, is or is not clearly ruled out by the 
statute.  Step One contemplates that the judge, viewing all relevant legal materials, will in 
some cases conclude both that (1) the best reading of the statute is X rather than Y, but 
that (2) the statute does not clearly mandate X rather than Y.  The latter possibility makes 
a theory of permissible interpretation necessary at Step One as well as at Step Two.  And 
as we will see, the need for a second-order theory of this kind gives rise to a range of 
distinctive problems.   
 3. Deference regimes.   
We have mentioned two different distinctions: de novo judicial interpretation, on the one 
hand, versus Chevron doctrine on the other; majority rule, on the one hand, versus a 
supermajority rule, on the other.  Correlating these two distinctions, four deference 
regimes are possible.   
 (1) De novo judicial interpretation with a majority rule.  This is a regime of no 
deference at all.  Before Chevron, many cases suggested that this was the law, although 
there were contrary decisions as well.38  Starting from this baseline, there are two ways to 
push the law towards greater deference: by adopting a legal doctrine of deference, and by 
adopting a voting rule weighted in the agency’s favor.  We take up these possibilities in 
turn. 
 (2) Chevron with a majority rule.  This is the solution the Court adopted in 1984.  
In our terms, it is a soft rather than a hard solution.  We suggest below that this solution 
produces a range of costs and problems that might be avoided by adopting a hard solution 
                                                 
36  E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters:  How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, 
Courts, and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 11-12 (2005); Sunstein, Beyond 
Marbury, supra note __.  
37 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).   
38 Compare NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (suggesting de novo judicial interpretation 
of “pure” questions of law), with Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939), and 
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) (suggesting judicial deference to agency interpretations).   
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instead.  Of course, if (1) and (2) were the only options, (2) might well be thought 
preferable.39  But we will argue that a different regime is better still. 
 (3)  De novo judicial interpretation with a supermajority rule (weighted in favor 
of agency interpretations).  This is the regime we denote by the label “Chevron as a 
voting rule”; our suggestion is that it is superior to (2), because it captures the benefits of 
(2) at lower cost.  Starting from the current regime – Chevron combined with majority 
rule – a move to Chevron as a voting rule requires two legal changes, not just one.  Both 
the legal standard and the voting rule are changed, the former by abolishing Chevron 
doctrine in favor of de novo judicial interpretation, the latter by adopting a supermajority 
rule. 
 (4) Chevron with a supermajority rule.  In principle, there is no reason to think 
that soft and hard solutions are mutually exclusive; the two might be combined so as to 
capture the distinctive benefits of both regime (2) and regime (3).  In practice, however, 
this regime should suffer from the same problems as regime (2), problems that we detail 
in full below.  The defects of regime (2) arise from the two-level structure of Chevron 
reasoning and the conceptual, psychological and motivational burdens that structure 
imposes upon judges; merely grafting a supermajority rule on to Chevron leaves the two-
level structure in place, and thus fails to get at the root of the problem.  Moreover, the 
pure cases – regimes (2) and (3) – illustrate the relevant considerations more cleanly.  
Subject to that caveat, Chevron with a supermajority rule could provide some of the 
benefits of a hard voting rule, albeit without avoiding the costs of a soft doctrinal 
approach.  
 Against this background, we focus on comparing regimes (2) and (3).  Our basic 
argument is that regime (3) captures the benefits of regime (2) at lower cost. 
B.  Aggregation: Solving Chevron Problems 
 We suggested that Chevron doctrine requires judges to distinguish between first-
order interpretation, namely, finding the best reading of the statute, and second-order 
interpretation, which supposes a theory of permissible or reasonable interpretation.  In 
operation, this requirement produces a range of problems, many of which can be avoided 
or ameliorated by adopting a voting-rule solution.  For simplicity, we assume throughout 
that the relevant case is binary – an agency offers one interpretation of the statute, a 
challenger offers another, and the judicial task is to choose between them.  Some cases 
are not like this, but most cases are, and the costs of the extension would outweigh its 
marginal intellectual benefits. 
 1. Conceptual problems.   
What exactly does it mean to say that an agency’s interpretation, although not best 
by the judge’s lights, is nonetheless reasonable or permissible?  What does it mean to say 
that a statute “clearly” means X, as opposed to saying that the statute is best read to mean 
X?  The answers to these questions are themselves hardly clear.  Under Chevron doctrine, 
the hardest question is where, even in principle, the bounds of permissible interpretation 
should be taken to lie. 
                                                 
39  As one of us has argued.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). 
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 Consider the following construal, which is quite artificial but useful for expository 
purposes.  Under standard first-order interpretation, the judge (let us suppose) is 
considering two different readings of the statute, X and Y.  Consulting all legal materials 
that are relevant under the judge’s first-order interpretive theory (text, perhaps legislative 
history, perhaps various interpretive default rules, and so on) the judge decides that 
reading X is, all things considered, somewhat superior to Y – that X is 65% likely to be 
correct, while Y is only 35% likely to be correct.  Under de novo interpretation, the judge 
votes in favor of X.  Under Chevron, however, another layer of decisionmaking is 
required.  The judge must ask whether X, at the 65% level, is “clearly” correct as 
opposed to simply better; alternatively, the judge could ask whether Y, at the 35% level, 
is reasonable or permissible. 
 The example suggests that first-order interpretation is strictly comparative — the 
judge simply decides which interpretation is better — while a theory of permissible 
interpretation must build in an absolute threshold above which interpretations may, but 
need not, be adopted by agencies.  The problem is that nothing in Chevron tells judges, 
even in principle, where the threshold should be located, and the metric for setting the 
threshold is obscure, even in principle.  Perhaps an interpretation that is plausible at the 
35% level suffices; perhaps it does not.  Perhaps an interpretation that reaches the 65% 
level is “clearly” correct, or perhaps not.  And in both these cases, it is hardly clear what 
or where the relevant “level” is.  With judges of reasonably diverse preferences and 
psychologies, thresholds may vary widely, and it will not be possible to say that any 
threshold is conceptually preferable to any other.  
 The switch to regime (3), Chevron as a voting rule, avoids the problem of an 
absolute threshold altogether.  Each judge now asks, simply in comparative terms, what 
the better reading of the statute is.  The purpose of Chevron’s second-order approach to 
interpretation – providing space for agency policy judgments — is still fulfilled, just at 
the aggregate level of the whole court rather than at the level of individual judicial 
judgments.  Assuming reasonable and predictable diversity of first-order interpretations 
across judges on multimember courts, breathing room for agency policy judgments will 
arise from the operation of the voting rule itself.  In our example, some judges will decide 
that the agency’s interpretation Y reaches only the 35% level, and will vote to overturn its 
interpretation (no consideration of thresholds is here required).  Other judges will decide, 
by contrast, that the agency’s interpretation reaches the 65% level of likelihood.  Unless a 
supermajority of the judges adopts the former view, the agency will prevail.  Across 
cases, as agency interpretations become less and less plausible, it is more and more likely 
that a supermajority will be found to overturn them.  Crucially, however, none of the 
judges in any case need wrestle with the conceptually obscure problem of where to locate 
the threshold of permissible interpretation. 
 A nuance in this picture is worth emphasizing: to say that under de novo judicial 
interpretation judges search for the “best” reading is imprecise, although useful as a 
shorthand.  Where the case is binary, as we assume throughout, judges need only decide 
which of the two readings offered by the parties is the better one.  This comparative 
judgment is, plausibly, much easier than the judgment that Chevron requires about the 
location of the reasonableness threshold.  The latter judgment is an absolute one, with no 
clear metric against which to make the judgment in the first place.  It is familiar that 
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absolute judgments are often more difficult than comparative ones.  The question “was 
the Duke of Wellington tall?” is harder than the question “was the Duke of Wellington 
taller than Napoleon?” 
 These points bracket any questions about outcomes – about the rate at which 
agency interpretations are upheld.  It is possible, in particular cases, that a shift from 
doctrinal Chevron to Chevron as a voting rule will result in invalidations of agency 
interpretations that would not have occurred under doctrinal Chevron.  Consider a case in 
which (1) a supermajority of judges believe that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable 
(or, equivalently, that the statute does not clearly rule it out) but also believe that (2) the 
agency’s interpretation is not the better reading.  Under doctrinal Chevron the agency 
would win if judges have internalized the doctrinal norm, because a (super)majority 
would vote in the agency’s favor, whereas under Chevron as a voting rule the agency will 
lose, because a supermajority will vote against.   
 This is merely one possible case, however.  Consider the opposite possibility: any 
case in which a bare majority of the multimember court believes that the statute clearly 
rules out the agency’s interpretation, or equivalently that the agency’s interpretation is 
impermissible.  In such cases, the agency would lose under doctrinal Chevron but will 
win under Chevron as a voting rule.  It is unclear, before the fact, which type of case is 
more frequent, and thus unclear what the outcome effects of the change in regime would 
be.  Moreover, if Chevron as a voting rule produces too little deference, according to 
some extrinsic theory, the supermajority requirements can be calibrated upwards.  A 
requirement of unanimity on the Supreme Court to overturn agency decisions would 
either produce massively increased deference in decided cases, or would produce a 
selection effect such that litigants would challenge only the most egregious agency 
decisions.   
 Our suggestion also sidesteps current controversies about which legal sources 
count, and what weights are given to the sources that do count, at Chevron Step One.  
Consider “nondelegation canons” – canons that trump agency interpretations of otherwise 
ambiguous statutes, and thus count as reasons to hold statutes “clear” at Step One.40  On 
our view, such canons would just be folded into the legal inquiry as reasons for individual 
judges to reject agency interpretations, all things considered, on the ground that the 
agency’s reading of the statute is likely to be wrong.  The effect of such canons would 
then be picked up by the voting rule; where a canon of this sort has weight, it is more 
likely that individual judges will contribute to the supermajority necessary to override the 
agency’s interpretation. 
 2. Psychological burdens.   
In an influential early discussion of Chevron and agency deference, Justice Breyer 
touched on the problems inherent in judging under a second-order theory of permissible 
interpretation: 
A third reason why neither a strict view of Chevron nor any other strictly defined 
verbal review formula requiring deference to an agency’s interpretation of law can 
prove successful in the long run, is that such a formula asks judges to develop a 
                                                 
40  Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).   
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cast of mind that often is psychologically difficult to maintain.  It is difficult, after 
having examined a legal question in depth with the object of deciding it correctly, 
to believe both that the agency's interpretation is legally wrong, and that its 
interpretation is reasonable. More often one concludes that there is a “better” view 
of the statute for example, and that the “better” view is “correct,” and the 
alternative view is “erroneous.”41  
The post-history of Chevron provides some evidence for this view.  Consider the 
decision in MCI v. AT&T.42  The Court, per Justice Scalia, concluded that an FCC rule 
exempting nondominant long-distance carriers from a filed-rate requirement exceeded the 
agency’s statutory authority, which was merely the authority to “modify”that 
requirement. In part, Justice Scalia argued that the plain meaning of “modify” 
encompassed only small changes, not large changes, pointing to dictionaries supporting 
his reading and discounting a prominent dictionary that said the contrary.  Whether or not 
Justice Scalia had the better reading of “modify,” it is implausible that the agency’s 
reading was clearly impermissible.  It is unclear whether, in fact, Justice Breyer’s 
conjecture is systematically correct, but it is certainly plausible in light of  decisions like 
MCI.  If Breyer  is correct, then the requirements of Chevron doctrine are unstable, 
because second-order interpretation is psychologically too demanding for judges. 
 Perhaps Justice Breyer’s claim proves too much.  In many areas of law, judges are 
asked to distinguish between their first-order judgments about what is correct, and their 
second-order judgments about what is permissible or reasonable.  One possibility, 
however, is that the distinction between first-order judgments and second-order 
judgments is more likely to be stable with regard to questions of fact, not of law, as 
where trial judges ask whether a jury verdict is based on a permissible view of the facts, 
or where an appellate court does the same.  The idea that decisions on legal questions 
might be more or less plausible, as opposed to correct or incorrect — that there might be 
different standards or thresholds for “proving the law”43 — is still alien to many judges 
trained in the pre-Chevron era.   
 More importantly, the point that judges make similar distinctions in other areas of 
law does not show that they do so successfully, or that Breyer is incorrect about Chevron.  
It is certainly imaginable that, in those other areas, the distinction tends to collapse as 
well, just as it does under Chevron (on Breyer’s view).  The same social-scientific tools 
that have usefully exposed decisionmaking distortions under Chevron might well be 
applied in other areas, with similar debunking effect.  That judges think the distinction 
between correctness and reasonableness works in some area of law is, of course, neither 
here nor there.  Breyer’s critique itself suggests that judges will think they are faithfully 
distinguishing the correct from the reasonable, while in fact self-serving bias, motivated 
reasoning and other mechanisms cause them to think that the only reasonable view is the 
one they happen to find correct.  Absent some evidence about whether and when judges 
make such distinctions successfully, the objection that “judges do it all the time” assumes 
away Breyer’s argument rather than undermining it. 
                                                 
41 Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 379 (1986). 
42 512 U.S. 218 (1994).  
43  Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). 
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 Suppose Justice Breyer is right, about Chevron at least.  Then it is straightforward 
that the shift to Chevron as a voting rule will eliminate the psychological burdens of 
second-order interpretation, removing a major source of instability in the law of agency 
deference.  The distinction between agency interpretations that are correct and agency 
interpretations that are reasonable will still exist.  But the distinction need not be 
internalized by individual judges.  Instead, it will arise from the operation of the voting 
rule itself.  Agency interpretations that are reasonable will be more likely to attract the 
votes necessary to block formation of a contrary supermajority.   
 3. Bias.   
Justice Breyer’s psychological conjecture about Chevron is plausible, but 
unproven.  By contrast, there is ample evidence that a related sort of slippage occurs 
under doctrinal Chevron: judges tend, systematically, to uphold agency interpretations 
that accord with their political preferences and to invalidate agency interpretations that do 
not.  On both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, judges are more  likely to 
uphold liberal agency action if they are liberal, and vice-versa if they are conservative.44  
This is not to say that Chevron has made no difference; the best evidence is that it has 
compressed or dampened ideological disagreement and increased deference to agencies, 
compared to the pre-Chevron world.45  These two findings are compatible.  There is more 
deference to agencies after Chevron, but at the margins that are currently litigated, 
deference to agencies is in substantial part a function of judges’ ideological and political 
commitments.  The difference between this point and Justice Breyer’s claim is clear, at 
least in principle.  The problem here is not that judges’ first-order legal views and their 
second-order legal views collapse into one another.  It is that their views are not being 
driven by legal materials at all, or at least not wholly. 
 Of course the attitudinal model of judging describes judicial behavior in many 
settings, not just the law of agency deference.46  The Chevron doctrine is not the cause of 
biased judging.  Yet a plausible conjecture is that Chevron doctrine provides greater 
scope for the operation of biased judging than would Chevron as a voting rule.  Under the 
former regime, judges acting in bad faith or in the grip of bias have, in effect, two 
margins on which to advance their agendas: the first-order interpretive question and the 
second-order interpretive question.  A judge who wishes, for quite extrinsic reasons, to 
uphold the agency interpretation may claim either that the agency interpretation is correct 
or that it is reasonable, whether or not correct.  Under Chevron as a voting rule, by 
contrast, the judge who wishes to uphold the agency interpretation must argue that the 
agency’s reading is correct.  To be sure, that determination may be made in a biased 
fashion, just as determinations of the best reading of the Constitution may be made in the 
same fashion.  Yet it is plausible that removing one margin on which bias can operate 
will improve matters.  Removing a degree of freedom for the biased judge, all else equal, 
                                                 
44  Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, supra note __. 
45  Id. 
46 The literature is vast, but for a canonical overview, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  See also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the 
New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997). Cf. 
Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 
(2000).     
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should lower the costs of monitoring by other judges, legislators, litigants and interested 
publics.  
 What about the opposite case, where the political judge wishes to invalidate 
agency action?  Under doctrinal Chevron, the judge must say that the agency’s 
interpretation is clearly incorrect.  Under Chevron as a voting rule, more simply, the 
judge must say that the agency’s interpretation is incorrect.  In either case, the judge has 
only one degree of freedom; the difference between them is that in the former case the 
legal inquiry is weighted in the agency’s favor, while in the latter case the voting rule is 
weighted in the agency’s favor.  The upshot is that Chevron as a voting rule provides no 
more scope for biased judges who wish to invalidate agency action, provides less scope 
for biased judges who wish to validate agency action, and yet weights the scales in the 
agency’s favor to the same degree across all cases (or can be calibrated to do so, as we 
discuss below).  If reducing biased judging is desirable, then this is a pure improvement, 
whatever level of deference to agencies one desires and whatever particular conception of 
biased judging one holds. 
 4. A note on bias in the lower courts.   
 The foregoing point applies to all courts, including the Supreme Court, in which 
recent findings have shown discernible ideological bias in Chevron cases.47  Lower courts 
present additional issues, in light of a recent finding that ideological bias interacts with 
panel composition in Chevron cases.  Where three judges of the same political party sit 
together, they are likely to show marked ideological bias; where two judges of one party 
sit with one judge of the other, the one is more likely to vote in line with the two’s 
political predilections than she would be if she sat with two other judges of her own 
party.48  How do these findings bear on the choice between deference regimes?  
 Assuming for argument’s sake that the findings reveal a problem, the switch to 
Chevron as a voting rule would constitute an improvement.  In the 2-1 case, under 
doctrinal Chevron plus majority rule, the lone dissenter knows that her dissenting vote 
will not change the outcome, and thus has an incentive to acquiesce in the majority’s 
decision.  Under Chevron as a voting rule, by contrast, any single judge can decide the 
case in the agency’s favor (because a 3-0 vote is necessary to override the agency’s 
interpretation); any incentive to acquiesce disappears.  What of the case where three 
judges of the same political party sit together on a panel and herd toward a preferred 
ideological outcome?  Here the only effect of Chevron as a voting rule is the one we 
previously discussed: by removing a degree of freedom from the biased judges, Chevron 
as a voting rule makes it more difficult, at the margin, for the biased group to justify their 
preferred results.  If the three judges are sufficiently determined, however, they may still 
rule as they please.  But this should be no surprise.  Where judges on a panel are 
unanimously bent on indulging their biases, there is little that either legal doctrine or 
voting rules can do.  Even this assumes that the desire to indulge bias is intentional.  If 
the bias is unconscious, then Chevron as a voting rule should still improve matters for the 
psychological reasons already discussed.  The switch to Chevron as a voting rule is no 
cure-all, of course; we merely suggest that it would make things better. 
                                                 
47 See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?, supra note ---.   
48 See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?, supra note ---. 
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 5. Internalization versus aggregation.   
 There is a common thread running through the foregoing points.  Doctrinal 
Chevron imposes greater demands on the individual judge than does Chevron as a voting 
rule.  Doctrinal Chevron requires the individual judge to internalize a complex, two-tier 
legal structure whose conceptual foundations are unclear, whose maintenance is 
psychologically burdensome, and which provides multiple degrees of freedom for the 
operation of bias.  This demand for costly internalization is accompanied by none of the 
incentives for internalization that appear elsewhere in law.  Against this background, it is 
hardly surprising that Chevron often fails, in the sense that the Chevron two-step  does 
not seem to be fairly applied; what is surprising is that it often succeeds.  Chevron as a 
voting rule, by contrast, makes deference an aggregate property of the voting group, 
rather than a norm to be internalized by the individual judge, and thus alleviates these 
burdens.   
C.  Calibration  
1. In general.   
A relatively obvious but nonetheless critical advantage of Chevron as a voting 
rule is the ability to better calibrate the level of deference given to agency decisions.  In 
the doctrinal formulation, judges are told to defer to reasonable agency interpretations.  
The soft version of Chevron treats deference as though it were  an on-off switch, a 
dichotomous variable.  In our view, deference is better conceived as a matter of degree.  
If the doctrinal solution is like a traditional light switch, the voting rule is akin to a 
dimmer, allowing more fine-grained degrees of deference to be matched to underlying 
legal goals.  If, in practice, a deference norm produces too little deference, then the voting 
rule allows deference to be ratcheted up or ratcheted down with greater precision.  On a 
nine member court, if a 5-4 majority rule generates too little deference to agencies, then a 
6-3, 7-2, 8-1, or 9-0 requirement can be adopted.  Requiring eight or nine votes to 
overturn an agency action is the equivalent of an extremely strong norm of deference 
within the doctrinal Chevron framework.  We do not here assert that such a strong 
deference rule is the optimal one.  Our point is merely that no matter what one’s view of 
the optimal level of deference, be it strong, weak, or non-existent, the voting rule model 
allows for more fine-grained calibration to that goal.   
Such graduation is, of course, possible with doctrine as well.  A doctrine might 
command that agency action only be overturned if the decision is (a) unreasonable, (b) 
clearly unreasonable, or (c) implausible.  There is no shortage of linguistic variants in 
theory, and as a result soft doctrinal rules are capable of calibration too.  The trouble is 
that our historical experience suggests the categorical distinctions are riddled with 
uncertainty.  How much less deference does the unreasonable standard produce than the 
“clearly unreasonable” standard?  A lot; a little; none at all?  Indeed, the more linguistic 
variants one uses, the greater a morass the doctrinal solution becomes.   Two examples 
from administrative law underline  the point.   
One way to understand the Mead doctrine is as an attempt to generate categories 
or levels of deference.  On this view, Chevron deference constitutes “strong” deference, 
whereas Skidmore deference constitutes “weak deference.”  To determine whether an 
action qualifies for Chevron deference at all, the Court now asks whether this type of 
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agency action or decision is of the sort on which Congress would want courts to defer to 
agencies.  Mead suggests that a powerful indicator of this fictitious Congressional intent 
is the procedure used to generate the decision.  If the interpretation was made via formal 
rulemaking, formal adjudication, or informal rulemaking, the requisite Congressional 
intent is (very probably) present.49  If the interpretation was issued via informal 
adjudication, however, it might or might not qualify for Chevron deference, depending on 
whether Congress intended the agency decision to have the force of law, all things 
considered.50  If the decision does not qualify for Chevron deference, it might still qualify 
for Skidmore (persuasive) deference.  It remains unclear precisely what content will be 
given to the revitalized Skidmore doctrine.  But one potential view is that Skidmore 
deference and Chevron deference represent two different levels of deference, perhaps 
corresponding to two different justifications or rationalizations for the respective 
deference doctrines.   On this view, the innovation of Mead is not just to institute a case-
specific test for the applicability of Chevron, but also to carve out different levels of 
deference for different sorts of agency decisions.  In our terms, Mead is an attempt at 
calibration, an attempt to refine the crude defer-don’t defer framework by adding more 
gradations.   
This reading of Mead is not inevitable; but it is not implausible.  If it is correct, it 
suggests a striking sympathy for the calibration intuition on the part of many Justices.  In 
this setting, the benefits of the voting rule relative to the doctrinal rule are particularly 
vivid.  Mead has engendered serious confusion in the lower courts.51   A simple voting 
rule would provide for much greater calibration with much less confusion and chaos.  If 
one concludes that agency decisions in informal adjudication should be given less 
deference than those in formal adjudications, all that need be done is to require a 5-4 vote 
to overturn the former and a 6-3 vote to overturn the latter, or (if more deference is 
desirable) a 6-3 vote to overturn the former and a 7-2 vote to overturn the latter, and so 
on.  The point is that if calibration is the goal, a voting rule is a far more precise tool than 
legal doctrine.   
For a second example, consider the arbitrary and capricious and substantial 
evidence standards for review of factual determinations in agency proceedings. The 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review for informal proceedings52 is more deferential 
than the substantial evidence standard the APA uses in formal proceedings,53 or so many 
commentators have suggested.54  But over time the two standards have arguably 
                                                 
49 Justice Breyer has suggested that the Mead framework provides no safe harbors.  See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2712–13 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
50 Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that a formal rulemaking proceeding is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to qualify for Chevron deference). Mead does make clear, however, that the 
use of any procedural mode other than informal adjudication is a strong indicator of congressional intent to 
delegate law-interpreting authority to the agency.  
51 Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, supra note __. 
52 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfg. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
53 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
54See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1429-30 
(2004); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive 
Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1065 (1995).  See also  Am. Paper Institute, Inc. v. 
Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n. 7 (1983). 
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converged,55 further illustrating the instability that arises when linguistic distinctions are 
used to calibrate deference.  Although the standards are different in theory, in practice the 
dividing line seems to have been all but erased.  This is not the fault of judges, at least not 
directly.  It is a consequence of the difficulty with using relatively crude linguistic 
distinctions to calibrate different levels of deference to particular settings.   
     
2.  Calibration in the lower courts.   
As a general matter, the larger the number of judges or Justices on a multi-
member court, the greater the ability to calibrate, and therefore the calibration argument 
is strong  for the Supreme Court, or en banc circuit courts, but weak to nonexistent  for 
three judge panels.  A three judge panel applying the Chevron framework must ask 
whether the agency’s interpretation is permissible, and a two-judge majority of the panel 
can overturn the agency’s decision.  A majority rule vote on whether the agency’s 
decision was correct reduces to de novo judicial review.  Thus, to maintain the degree of 
deference to agency decisions, the simple majority rule must be replaced with a 
unanimity rule (3-0), which leaves no room for greater calibration.  This does not mean 
that voting rule deference is bereft of benefits for three judge panels; quite the contrary.   
But we cannot count calibration as one of them.  That said, the calibration benefits do 
accrue for en banc decisions by the circuits.  Indeed, on large circuits, en banc panels 
might provide even greater opportunity for calibration than does the Supreme Court.   
The core observation might be taken to argue for increasing the size of panels to, 
perhaps, five judges in administrative law cases.  While that transition would 
significantly increase the decisional burdens on individual judges by requiring them to sit 
in more cases, it is not altogether implausible in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, where most agency actions are heard, and where the docket is significantly 
lighter than in many other circuits.  This is a separate proposal, one we will not pursue 
here; the larger point is that some problems with or objections to Chevron as a voting rule 
might easily be remedied by changes on other margins of institutional design.      
The en banc setting also suggests a parallel relationship between a hard voting 
rule and deference to prior judicial precedent.  In the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, the standard rule is that a three judge panel may not overrule the decision of a 
prior panel.56  Only the en banc court may do so.  This is a voting rule, which states that 
no panel of three judges may overrule the decision of a prior panel of three judges.  A 
majority of the sitting members of the en banc panel is required.  The voting rule version 
of stare decisis defers to the decision of the prior panel unless and until a majority of the 
sitting en banc court indicates otherwise.  True, the voting rule for the en banc court is 
                                                 
55 Assoc. of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the arbitrary and capricious test is the same as the substantial evidence test as applied to 
findings of fact).  See also Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and 
Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 541, 
553-63 (1986). 
56 LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“One three-judge panel . . . does not 
have the authority to overrule another three-judge panel of the court.”); United States v. Kolter, 71 F.3d 
425, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“This panel would be bound by [a prior] decision even if we did not agree with 
it.”).   
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majoritarian, not super-majoritarian, but in an important sense that is precisely the 
calibration point.  The current hard regime of stare decisis gives level X  of deference to 
prior decisions. An alternative regime could produce level X – Y  by requiring a 
submajority vote of the en banc court (but presumably greater than a majority of the 
panel), or deference level X + Y  by requiring a super-majority vote of the en banc court. 
Not all circuits use this rule; the Ninth Circuit, for example does not. Circuit-specific 
preferences about the strength of deference to precedent will vary.  But voting rule stare 
decisis allows different circuits to better tailor the strength of deference to prior decisions.      
We do not mean to over-emphasize the calibration point.  But administrative law 
is centrally concerned with identifying the appropriate degree of deference courts should 
give agencies.  The tools judges and legislators use to calibrate should be up to the task. 
The above examples suggest that linguistic distinctions are fragile and ineffective 
methods of calibrating deference levels, as compared to voting rules.   
D.  Certainty  
 The shift from a soft internalized norm of deference to deference as an aggregate 
property also reduces costly uncertainty of several sorts in administrative law.  Voting 
rule deference increases predictability and stability, and reduces subjective uncertainty.  
To the extent that clarity, precision, and the ability of potential litigants to confidently 
predict judicial analysis are desirable, Chevron as a voting rule is preferable to doctrinal 
deference.   
 1. Predictability.   
 To say that there is uncertainty in a legal regime is really to say that it is difficult 
to predict either the content of legal rules, the likelihood that a given rule will be applied 
in a specific case, or how such rules will translate into legal outcomes.57 For example, 
Justice Scalia has long urged a strong and broad presumption of deference because a rule-
like presumption reduces uncertainty about whether the deference framework will be 
applied.58  Chevron supposedly displaced two lines of cases, one of which commanded 
courts to review agency determinations of law de novo, and the other of which suggested 
deference.  In any given setting, the case line the Court happened to select was 
unpredictable, which created confusion and uncertainty for agencies and litigants.  
Chevron was supposed to remedy all this, but has hardly fulfilled its promise. On our 
view, that should not be surprising.  One of the key reasons for the apparent failure of 
Chevron to eliminate if not significantly reduce uncertainty about deference is that the 
framework makes deference an individual rather than aggregate property of the judicial 
system, and relies on underspecified norms that are imperfectly internalized by judges.     
To get some traction on these questions, return to two points above.  First, 
doctrinal Chevron contains inherent ambiguity about what it commands of judges.  All 
agree that judges should defer to reasonable, that is to say, permissible agency 
interpretations.  But as we have already discussed, what permissible means is itself highly 
uncertain.  How unlikely must an agency interpretation before it is impermissible?  
                                                 
57 For a general treatment of predictability and uncertainty in the context of precedent, see Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987).  
58 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989). 
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Ninety percent unlikely? Forty-five percent unlikely? The Court has not said, and the 
views of individual judges will vary.  This inter-judge variation generates an additional 
dimension of uncertainty. Moreover, suppose we are correct that compressing Chevron 
into a single step inquiry, thereby removing one degree of freedom for bias to operate, 
reduces the ability of biased judges to manipulate the outcome of cases.  So long as the 
potential injection of bias is a source of uncertainty about how judges will behave, the 
reduction of that source should produce a corresponding gain along the certainty 
dimension.   The core intuition is simply that less discretion and more parsimonious 
decision processes should reduce uncertainty.   
Within the doctrinal Chevron framework, agencies and regulated parties know 
that as a formal matter, deference will be given to agency interpretations.  But whether 
deference will be given in practice is a function of heterogeneous interpretive methods 
used by individual judges and  divergent views about the degree of clarity in statutes. 
Take Justices Breyer and Scalia as ideal types. Justice Scalia favors a broad application 
of deference to all agency decisions that represent the authoritative view of the agency, a 
strong rule-like presumption about whether to apply the deference framework at all, and 
aggressive textualist statutory analysis that is far more likely than not to find that 
Congress definitely resolved the issue.59  Justice Breyer favors application of the Chevron 
doctrine to a narrower range of cases, a case-by-case inquiry into whether to apply the 
deference framework, and is generally more likely to find statutory ambiguity at Chevron 
Step One.60  Even just focusing on two Justices produces confusion about how Chevron 
will function in each of these three dimensions.  The picture is no rosier when we expand 
the universe of potential judges beyond Justices Scalia and Breyer.  Each judge brings his 
own interpretive idiosyncrasies. The unfortunate result is marked heterogeneity of views 
about how doctrinal Chevron functions in each of these dimensions. Unfortunately, the 
more heterogeneity we observe at the level of the individual judge, the less certainty there 
is about how (and even whether) doctrinal Chevron will function in practice.    
Chevron as a voting rule does not face these same dangers.   Conditional on an 
agreed-upon trigger for either doctrinal or voting rule deference, the agency’s decision 
will be upheld unless a supermajority of the panel concludes the agency’s interpretation 
of the statute was incorrect.  Different judges may well have different thresholds for 
identifying the “right” answer in statutory interpretation.  But doctrinal Chevron produces 
uncertainty at an additional stage of the analysis as well — the determination  whether 
the agency’s interpretation is permissible.61   
                                                 
59 Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, supra note __, at 860.   
60 Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, supra note __, at 860. 
61 The change in predictability may vary somewhat with respect to certain subsets of cases.   For example, 
take a statute that is vaguely or generally phrased.  If each judge is completely unsure whether the agency is 
correct such that each would flip a coin, individual level deference would cause each judge to vote for the 
agency.  The Chevron doctrine would constitute a tie-breaker for each judge.   Under Chevron as a voting 
rule, given the same circumstances,  the agency’s decision will be rejected roughly 12 percent of the time 
on a three-judge panel, because there is a 1/8chance that all three judges will “decide” (randomly) to vote 
against the agency.   In this stylized example, it is possible that doctrinal deference would produce greater 
predictability than voting rule deference.  However, the voting rule still produces extremely predictable 
deference--in upwards of 90 percent of the draws will the agency’s decision be upheld.    Even in a world 
where judges essentially flip coins, the voting rule produces predictable outcomes.  The more important 
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 2. Stability.   
 A closely related but analytically distinct question is whether voting rule 
deference produces greater stability in the law.  The intuition here is closely tied to 
conventional discussions of stare decisis.62 Strong norms of stare decisis are supposedly 
desirable because they support reliance interests and reduce uncertainty in the legal 
system.63  Here, both courts and commentators are really focused on stability, where 
stability quickly reduces to the actual probability of legal change.  A low probability 
corresponds to a strong norm of stare decisis; a high probability to a weak or non-existent 
norm. Debates about the optimal level of change or stickiness in the law are staid, and we 
have little to add to the debate on its own terms.64   As a side issue, however, all the 
arguments we have made about voting rules apply with equal force to stare decisis.  Stare 
decisis is a crude mechanism for ensuring stability of precedents.  Supermajority voting 
rules would accomplish the identical goals, with greater calibration and fewer costs.   
Others have urged that Chevron produces too much or too little legal change — 
too high or too low a probability of overturning final agency decisions.65  But rather than 
advancing any particular theory about the optimal level of stickiness in administrative 
law, we have suggested that Chevron as a voting rule is a more effective way to achieve 
any given rate of change, for the reasons noted above.  The flexibility afforded by the 
voting rule allows one to better tailor the degree of stability in the law.  In the stare 
decisis example, it avoids the inevitable uncertainty of lumpy linguistic formulations of 
“strong” and “super-strong” levels of deference accorded to prior judicial decisions.66  A 
voting rule that requires a supermajority or unanimity to overturn precedent might or 
                                                                                                                                                 
point is that the voting rule produces greater predictability in the legal system, on balance, because it is 
extremely costly (and perhaps impossible) to identify judicial beliefs with precision ex ante.  Individual-
level heterogeneity with respect to interpretive methods, and disagreement about clarity or precision in the 
underlying statute itself combine to produce uncertainty about whether agency views will receive 
deference.            
62 See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective:  An Economic Analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643 (2000); Lawrence E. Blume and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 408-10, 428 (2982).  
63 Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 871, 823 (2002).   
64 Much of this literature also relates closely to the notion of transition costs in law. See generally Louis 
Kaplow, Legal Transitions:  A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161 (2003); 
Frederick Schauer, Legal Transitions:  Is There a Way To Deal with the Non-ideal World of Legal 
Change?, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261, 264  (2003) (comparing costs of small scale legal transition to 
large scale legal transition).  
65 Compare Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern 
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2000), Cass R. Sunstein, 
Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990), and Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989), with 
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 
(1992), Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of 
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 308-14 (1988), and Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases 
per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).   
66See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988). See also 
Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989);  Frank Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL 
L. REV. 422, 427 (1988).   
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might not create stronger presumptions that initial decisions will remain.  However, the 
voting rule model allows for more fine-grained distinctions.  As a result, for any given 
level of desired stability, a voting rule reduces subjective uncertainty about the 
probability of legal change.   
3. Subjective Uncertainty.   
The predictability and stability issues are relevant to the effects of voting, but our 
central claim is that Chevron as a voting rule reduces subjective uncertainty.   What 
matters is not only the actual content of the law, or the probability that a given legal rule 
will be applied, or the ultimate probability that an agency decision will be overturned, but 
also how agencies and regulated parties perceive events in judicial challenges.   Can 
potential litigants accurately predict these dynamics?  If so, how costly is it for them to 
do so?  What informational burdens do the respective deference frameworks force 
potential litigants to bear?   
  When an agency promulgates a rule, both the agency and the regulated parties 
will attempt to estimate the probability that the decision will survive a challenge in the 
courts.  If the EPA thinks a final rule is unlikely to survive, they may not promulgate it at 
all.  More likely, the agency will revise the rule so as to reduce the probability that the 
rule will be struck down.  A private party affected by the rule must make a similar 
calculation.  Suppose the EPA administrator estimates the probability of overturning to 
be p=.25. This estimate carries with it a variance, which can be understood as the degree 
of subjective uncertainty about the point estimate.   
Imagine a simple bell curve with the probability or point estimate as the mean.67  
As the variance of the estimate falls, the slope over the curve becomes steeper and the 
curve more compressed around the point estimate.  As the variance increases, the slope 
becomes more gradual and number of points covered grows.  In Bayesian terms, the 
precision of the estimate changes.  The Administrator may be extremely confident that 
p=.25, in which case the curve, representing her subjective uncertainty, will be quite 
compact.  For example, perhaps the Administrator thinks p=.25, that there is some 
reasonable chance p actually equals .30 or .20, but that there is virtually no chance it is 
higher or lower than that.  We characterize this is a low uncertainty case.  Alternatively, 
the Administrator may hold the same point estimate, p=.25, that the courts will strike 
down the final rule, but have more subjective uncertainty about the estimate.  Envision a 
longer tailed distribution, with the low end of the curve approaching zero and the high 
end of the curve approaching .85.  We characterize this as the high uncertainty case. Our 
core claim is that voting rule deference reduces subjective uncertainty of this sort; it 
allows potential litigants to form better, more confident, estimates of the probability that 
agency decisions will be upheld.  The two regimes might also produce actual changes in 
p, but we intentionally hold p constant for purposes of discussion.  
Why might Chevron as a voting rule reduce subjective uncertainty?  To start with, 
the variance of an aggregate judgment is partially a function of the variance of its 
component parts. This phrasing may be opaque, but the idea is straightforward. EPA must 
decide how a randomly selected judge will vote in a given case.  To calculate that 
                                                 
67 The technically proper probability distribution function would not be normal, but a distribution bounded 
by 0 and 1, like the Beta distribution.     
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estimate in the doctrinal Chevron framework, the agency must ascertain whether the 
judge will find a clear congressional statement in the statute, and whether, absent a clear 
statutory resolution of the issue, the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.  One possibility 
is that EPA takes the statute to be clear and estimates the judge will agree.  Here, there is 
uncertainty about that judgment, but there is no additional uncertainty from Chevron Step 
Two.  If, however, EPA takes the statute to be ambiguous and estimates the judge will 
agree, EPA must also estimate the probability that the judge will find its interpretation 
reasonable.  There is a variance associated with the estimates required at both Steps One 
and Two of Chevron.  Because voting rule Chevron requires only one stage of estimation, 
the variance will be lower.  The simple claim is that the fewer stages of judicial decision 
that EPA must guess about, the less subjective uncertainty that will characterize the 
administrator’s judgment.   
The other source of a reduction in subjective uncertainty stems from making 
deference an aggregate rather than individual characteristic.  A supermajority voting rule 
generates less subjective uncertainty than does doctrinal deference because an external 
observer need not estimate whether each individual judge or a majority of judges will 
fully internalize the norm of deference. Figuring out whether deference will result no 
longer requires a potential litigant to guess whether or how individual judges will defer.  
Rather, deference is an unavoidable characteristic of the voting procedure.  Thus, while a 
potential litigant may still face uncertainty about how a given judge will vote in a case, 
she will not face the additional uncertainty about whether deference will be applied in 
practice.  Holding constant the actual probability of overruling the agency view, our 
suggestion is that the precision of the point estimate is greater; there is less uncertainty 
about the deference regime.  As a result, external observers can have greater confidence 
in their judgments.   
 We have discussed a variety of certainty-related ideas:  predictability, stability, 
and subjective uncertainty.  In none of these contexts does Chevron as a voting rule fare 
worse than doctrinal Chevron, and in many contexts it fares better.  Outcomes of 
administrative law cases will be more predictable, and likely clearer and simpler from the 
view of external observers.   On balance, infusing deference into the law via voting rules 
should reduce confusion and uncertainty and replace it with relative clarity and 
transparency.      
 
III.  COSTS AND OBJECTIONS 
 So far we have discussed the benefits of switching from doctrinal Chevron to 
Chevron as a voting rule; our suggestion has been that the switch would accomplish the 
objectives of doctrinal Chevron at lower cost.  Are there offsetting costs that would arise 
from switching to the new regime?  Here we examine some objections to Chevron as a 
voting rule.  We suggest that these objections either are invalid, or apply equally to 
doctrinal Chevron, and thus afford no basis for preferring one regime to the other. 
A.  Voting Theorems 
 Under Chevron as a voting rule, a supermajority of a multimember judicial panel 
would be necessary to overturn agency interpretations of law.  Two well-known voting 
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theorems – May’s Theorem and the Condorcet Jury Theorem – support majority rule.  
Neither theorem, however, supplies a cogent objection to a supermajority rule in this 
setting. 
 1.  May’s Theorem.   
 In the simplest version, where two options are involved, May’s Theorem says that 
only majority rule satisfies a stipulated set of conditions, including neutrality (neither 
option is preferred by the voting rule), anonymity (the outcome does not depend upon 
which voter ends up on which side), and two more technical conditions.68 The force of 
May’s Theorem is that if the conditions are attractive, majority rule should also be 
attractive.  Conversely, if one rejects majority rule in some setting, one should also be 
willing to explain why one or more conditions of the Theorem are unattractive.      69   
 In this setting, the nub of the argument is that neutrality should be rejected.  The 
outcome in which the agency interpretation prevails is more desirable than the outcome 
in which the agency interpretation is rejected, and the voting rule version of Chevron 
merely reflects this.  The point of Chevron is to put a thumb on the scales in favor of 
agency interpretations of law, in order to allocate interpretive authority between agencies 
and courts.  A Chevron supermajority rule does so formally, through the aggregation 
mechanism; doctrinal Chevron with a majority rule does so as well, just informally, 
through legal doctrine that individual judges are required to internalize.  The move to 
doctrinal Chevron in 1984 already rejected neutrality, in substance if not in form. Our 
suggestion is just that the rejection of neutrality is best done explicitly in the voting rule 
itself.  Whether or not the suggestion is persuasive on other grounds, May’s Theorem 
supplies no valid objection to it.  
 2. Supermajority rules and the status quo.   
 Related to the foregoing is a point about agencies and policy change. A standard 
observation in voting theory is that supermajority rules, by violating neutrality, place a 
thumb on the scales in favor of the status quo.70  One might worry that using a 
supermajority rule in place of Chevron deference will produce too much status quo bias.   
 However, the status quo must be understood, here, in a legal rather than factual 
sense.  Suppose, as is usually the case, that the agency moves first by issuing an 
interpretation of the statute; this interpretation then becomes the new legal status quo. A 
supermajority rule in favor of the agency’s interpretation protects the new status quo as 
defined by the agency.  This approach does not protect the policy status quo, however.  
To the contrary, freeing up agencies to change policies, as Chevron does in either the 
doctrinal version or the voting-rule version, works to prevent regulatory policy from 
                                                 
68 Kenneth O. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority 
Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680 (1952). 
69  We bracket here recent extensions of May’s Theorem to multiple options.  See Robert Goodin & 
Christian List, Special Majorities Rationalized, BRITISH J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming).  We have assumed, 
throughout, that in most cases judges will face a choice between the agency’s interpretation and one offered 
by a litigant, and in any event many of our points hold, with appropriate modifications, when extended to 
the multiple-option case.   
70 This is (by definition) only true of “asymmetrical” supermajority rules, not of symmetrical ones; the 
latter respect neutrality but yield nontrivial ties.  For an explanation, see Goodin & List, Special Majorities 
Rationalized, supra note __. 
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becoming obsolete.  Under either version of Chevron, it is entirely legitimate for agencies 
to update policies in light of changing circumstances or changing democratic 
preferences.71  
 3. The Jury Theorem.   
 The Condorcet Jury Theorem says that where  right answers exist, and where  the 
average competence of the voting group exceeds .5, then the probability that majority 
voting will hit the right answer increases as the group’s size increases and as its average 
competence increases.72 Perhaps  the Jury Theorem suggests that majority rule is 
preferable, because a simple majority of judicial votes is most likely to get the answer 
right. 
 It is important to be clear that this point does not support regime (2) – Chevron 
plus majority rule – as compared to regime (3) – de novo judicial interpretation plus a 
supermajority rule.  The only plausible candidate for a “right answer,” here, is that there 
might be a right answer about what the relevant statute means.  To ask that question is to 
engage in de novo judicial interpretation, not Chevron deference.  The Jury Theorem 
objection is in effect an argument for regime 1 (de novo judicial interpretation with 
majority rule).  As our concern is to compare regimes (2) and (3), the objection is 
somewhat tangential to our enterprise. 
 In any event, the objection is also dubious on its own terms, for two reasons.  
First, we have said that de novo judicial interpretation requires judges to decide which 
party offers the better interpretation of the statute, after considering all permissible 
sources.  It is not at all clear that this sort of legally better answer counts as a “right 
answer” within the terms of the Jury Theorem.  Even if the better legal answer is quite 
indisputable relative to the rules, conventions and practices of the law, it is a separate and 
complex jurisprudential question whether that answer can be right or wrong in the same 
way that a guess about the number of beans in a jar can be right or wrong.  These are 
deep waters, which we will skim across.  But it is not obvious that the Jury Theorem even 
gets purchase in settings like these.   
 The second and more critical point is that even if the legally best answer counts as 
a “right answer” in the required sense, the Jury Theorem does not at all support a simple 
majority voting rule among judges.  The confusion here is a common one in discussions 
of the Jury Theorem.  The Theorem itself says nothing at all about the composition of the 
group that should be governed by majority rule; it is always necessary to ask “a majority 
of what”?  Arguments from the Jury Theorem to judicial majority rules are often flawed 
because they assume, arbitrarily, that only the votes of a majority of judges should be 
decisive, when in fact the votes of agency decision-makers are also useful inputs for Jury 
Theorem purposes.  
 Here is a deliberately artificial example, for clarity.  Suppose a multimember 
administrative commission, like the Federal Communications Commission, votes 4-1 in 
favor of an interpretation, on which (we are supposing) there is a right answer within the 
                                                 
71  Motor Vehicle Mfg. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
72  The Jury Theorem can be extended to multiple options, in which it case plurality rule is preferred.  See 
Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. 
POL. PHIL. 277, 283-88 (2001).  
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terms of the Jury Theorem.  Suppose also that review goes directly to the nine-member 
Supreme Court, which splits 5-4 against the rule.  The Jury Theorem, taken by itself, does 
not in the least suggest that the court’s view should trump the agency’s.  If all voters 
possess the same average competence, it is arbitrary to exclude the voters who happen to 
sit on the commission; with their votes, there is an 8-6 majority in the rule’s favor.  Even 
if the judges have higher average competence, including the agency voters can only 
improve the group’s aggregate accuracy, so long as the agency voters’ competence 
exceeds 50%.  At a minimum, even if courts should not look behind the agency decision 
to count the votes cast inside the agency, the agency should at least be counted as having 
cast one vote.73   
From this perspective, a supermajority rule in the agency’s favor is in effect a way 
to ensure that the agency has at least one virtual “vote” in the judicial proceedings.  The 
objection assumes, without foundation, that majority rule among the judges alone should 
be decisive.  The Jury Theorem, rightly understood, does not require this; indeed it 
supports the expansion of the group whose views are aggregated to include agency 
officials, and the supermajority rule in effect does just that.    
 
B.  Single Member Courts 
 A voting rule cannot be used to generate deference on single member panels.  
When a single judge considers and resolves a question of administrative law, an 
internalized norm of decision is the only viable way to provide deference to agency 
views.  If most Chevron questions were ultimately resolved by district court judges, that 
would surely limit the significance of our proposal.  However, most agency rules and 
many orders are appealed directly to the courts of appeals.74  Statutes providing authority 
to a diverse universe of agencies provide for direct review of agency actions in the courts 
of appeals.75  For the most part, review of agency action by single-member courts is of 
distinctly marginal importance in administrative law.   
 This is not to say to say that district courts never issue initial decisions reviewing 
agency action.  For example, challenges to enforcement actions pursuant to existing 
                                                 
73  Caminker makes similar points in discussing courts, legislatures and supermajority voting in the 
constitutional setting.  See Caminker, Thayerian Deference, supra note __. 
74 See Currie & Goodman, supra note __.   
75 See, e.g., The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was a model for many subsequent statutes on this 
front.  38 Stat. 717, 719 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).   The Natural Gas Act provides that a party 
aggrieved by an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission petitions for review directly to the 
courts of appeals.   15 U.S.C. 717(r)(b).  The Federal Power Act provides that adjudicative order issued 
under the statute may be appealed directly to the D.C. Circuit or the circuit in which the party is located.   
15 U.S.C. 3416(a)(1)(4).  The Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act provides that decisions 
by the FEC as to funds are reviewed by the court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit,  26 U.S.C. § 9041, as are 
other FEC decisions.   Orders and decisions by the Federal Communications Commission are generally 
directly reviewed by the D.C. Circuit.  See 47 U.S.C. 402.  Decisions of the SEC are appealed directly to 
courts of appeals as well, 15 U.S.C. 78y, as are most decisions of the NLRB, 29 U.S.C.  § 160(e).  Certain 
statutes, of course, give exclusive jurisdiction to a specific court of appeals, as the Clean Air Act does with 
review of EPA rules in the D.C. Circuit.  These examples are merely illustrative.  The action in 
administrative law unquestionably takes place in the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, even more 
so than in most areas of the law. 
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regulations will typically be brought in the district courts.  And for this subset of cases, 
Chevron as a voting rule could be implemented in one of two ways.  First, the district 
court could engage in de novo review of the agency action, subject to supermajority 
review by the multimember appellate court.  Second, the district court could continue to 
apply doctrinal deference while the reviewing panel would apply voting rule deference.  
The former rule would eliminate deference at the district court level, but would reveal 
helpful information about the district judge’s view of the statute.  The district judge’s 
view would then supply another data point for the court of appeals, along with the 
parties’ appellate arguments.  The second alternative is what we term a “mixed rule”:  
voting rule review of a doctrinal deference decision.76   
 We remain agnostic as to which alternative is preferable; either one is compatible 
with out proposal.  As to the first alternative, district judges would not defer themselves, 
but that is of little significance, because district court decisions are of little legal 
significance in administrative law (except as useful information for appellate courts).  
District court opinions have no precedential weight, and under current practice, reviewing 
courts tend to focus almost exclusively on the reasonableness of the agency’s decision, 
rather than on whether the district court’s evaluation of the agency’s action was faulty.  
Chevron commands deference to agency views; doctrinally the lower court’s decision is 
all but irrelevant.        
If one cares about ensuring deference by district judges as well as appellate 
courts,  a mixed rule would have to be used.  Yet mixing hard and soft deference rules at 
different levels of review does not generally produce perverse results.  To illustrate, 
suppose the district court judge applies a norm of deference and finds the agency's 
interpretation permissible.  There are four possible scenarios on appeal.  (1) A 
supermajority of the reviewing panel concludes the agency's interpretation was incorrect.  
Here, the agency's decision is struck down, but there is no conceptual oddity.  It simply 
means the appeals court and the district court disagreed, as upper and lower courts often 
do.  (2) A supermajority of the panel thinks the agency chose the right interpretation.  The 
agency's decision is upheld in both the district and circuit court; the hard and soft rules 
produce the same outcome.  (3) A bare majority of the circuit court finds the agency's 
interpretation incorrect, and therefore the agency's decision is upheld.  Again the voting 
rule and doctrinal deference norms both produce the same result.  (4) A bare majority of 
the circuit court finds the agency's decision correct, which implies that a minority of the 
appellate court found the decision incorrect.  The agency’s decision is upheld because a 
supermajority did not disagree. Again, the lower court and the reviewing panel reach the 
same decision.   None of these scenarios is unseemly.   
To the extent that deference is desirable in district courts, our voting rule cannot 
provide it.  A soft doctrinal rule is the only option available, its imperfections 
notwithstanding. However, this observation certainly does not imply that we should 
choose an inferior solution in far more important settings, such as the Supreme Court, 
where (we suggest) more effective alternatives exist.   
 
                                                 
76 See section III.F infra for a more complete discussion of mixed rules. 
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C.  Chevron as a Voting Rule, Step Zero? 
 What exactly is the voting rule that would prevail under Chevron as a voting rule?  
Under the Mead decision and its successors, the Court has rejected, for the time being, 
Justice Scalia’s argument that Chevron applies whenever the agency decision is 
“authoritative.”  Instead the Court has developed an elaborate body of law — Chevron 
Step Zero77 —  that determines whether Chevron will even apply at all.  Under Chevron 
Step Zero, the Court asks, roughly, whether there is an affirmative indication of a 
congressional intention to delegate law-interpreting power to the agency – using  various 
procedural indicators as defeasible proxies in this inquiry.78 
 Our proposal is neutral with respect to Chevron Step Zero.  The voting rule we 
suggest would apply when, and only when, Chevron Steps One and Two would otherwise 
apply under the doctrinal Chevron framework.  If Justice Scalia’s view were to prevail, 
then the Chevron voting rule would be triggered by any authoritative agency 
interpretation.  Under the current approach, the Chevron voting rule would be triggered 
by an affirmative finding of congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to the 
agency.  Chevron Step Zero has produced substantial uncertainty and ferment in the law 
of administrative deference.79 Our proposal does not inevitably improve this situation, but 
does not worsen it either.  We simply adopt whatever triggering conditions doctrinal 
Chevron assumes anyway. 
 However, our approach could also be extended to Step Zero.  A supermajority 
voting rule would also produce benefits and reduce uncertainty at Chevron Step Zero, 
although it would complicate the core analysis somewhat.  If some extrinsic theory 
suggests that most agency actions should qualify for Chevron deference, we could easily 
require a supermajority vote to remove an agency action from the Chevron framework 
and send it to either de novo review or Skidmore style deference.  That voting rule would 
reduce uncertainty at Step Zero, and could also be calibrated to produce a pro-deference 
bias if desirable.  On the other hand, if it were desirable that agency actions should rarely 
qualify for deference, a supermajority rule cutting against deference could just as easily 
be implemented.  Regardless, the point is that a voting rule formulation of Mead produces 
virtually the same benefits, vis-à-vis the doctrinal formulation of Mead, as the voting rule 
version of Chevron produces vis-à-vis its doctrinal cousin.    
 
D.  Agency Flexibility 
 Might using a voting rule to generate institutional deference undermine an 
agency’s ability to change course and adopt new interpretations in light of new 
information?   In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass. v. Brand X Internet Serv.,80 
the Court clarified the interaction between a prior judicial interpretation of a statute and 
                                                 
77  Merrill & Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, supra note __; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 187 (2006).   
78  United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
79  See Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, supra note __. 
80 125 S.Ct. 2688 (2005). 
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an agency’s subsequent and different interpretation of the same term.81  The Brand X 
majority held that a  
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that 
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves 
no room for agency discretion.82 
Put differently, when a court rejects an agency position because the statute 
unambiguously demands the interpretation the court adopted, the agency may not later 
adopt a different position.  When a court acknowledges statutory ambiguity, the agency 
maintains the flexibility to pick new interpretations in the future83--in effect picking an 
interpretation different than the one the prior court thought best.84  When a court finds 
that a statute requires a given interpretation, the agency is bound; when a court finds 
merely that an agency position is permitted, not.   
How would the Brand X framework interact with the regime we suggest?  
Because Chevron as a voting rule dispenses with the secondary reasonableness inquiry of 
doctrinal Chevron, perhaps the voting rule would reduce agency flexibility more 
frequently than does doctrinal Chevron.  That might be good, or bad, but it would be an 
important difference.   
However, there is in fact no reason to think that any such reduction in flexibility 
will occur.  So long as a supermajority of the reviewing court does not reject the agency’s 
interpretation, the agency remains free to adjust its position in the future ( so long as its 
changes in position are sufficiently explained, a requirement that obtains under doctrinal 
Chevron as well)85  When an agency receives institutional deference, all agency 
flexibility is preserved.  Indeed, our contention is that agency flexibility will be more 
cheaply and predictably preserved in these cases.   
On the other hand, if a supermajority of a panel rejects the agency’s interpretation 
as incorrect, the agency may not re-adopt its old position.  But that is true when a court 
rejects an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute as clearly wrong or 
unreasonable in the doctrinal Chevron framework as well, as Brand X makes clear.86  No 
greater reduction in agency flexibility inheres in the hard voting rule than the soft 
doctrinal rule.       
 
 
E.  Decision Costs 
 Perhaps the switch from doctrinal Chevron to Chevron as a voting rule (what we 
have called regimes (2) and (3)) would increase the costs of decisionmaking, at least for 
                                                 
81 For a proposal to address sequencing problems like this, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional 
Precedent:  Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002).    
82 Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2700.   
83 Id. at 2700-01. 
84 See id. at 2519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
85 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46. 
86 Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2700. 
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judges.  Suppose that under doctrinal Chevron, judges sometimes decide that the 
agency’s proffered interpretation is reasonable, in the absolute sense required by 
Chevron, without deciding which party’s interpretation is better (the comparative 
judgment required by de novo interpretation).  In those cases, the judges have avoided a 
further inquiry that is required under Chevron as a voting rule, and thus economized on 
the burdens of decision.  Judges can use the reasonableness inquiry to avoid the harder 
problem about what the statute, correctly interpreted, should best be taken to say. 
 The argument fails.  It is not the case that regime (3) requires judges to decide 
everything they must decide in regime (2), and then adds more.  Rather, regime (3) 
replaces the reasonableness question with the question of the better interpretation.  If the 
latter question is less costly to answer than the former, then the decision costs of regime 
(3) are lower, not higher, than the decision costs of regime (2).  And we suggest that the 
question whether an agency interpretation is reasonable is indeed harder, on average, than 
the question which party has the better interpretation.  The former requires an absolute 
judgment for which the metric is obscure, and thus imposes psychological burdens on 
judges.  The latter requires a relative judgment which is often easier. 
 Moreover, it is erroneous to say that under regime (2), the judge need only decide 
reasonableness.  Given the current law, particularly the Brand X decision, regime (2) 
requires the judge to go further, sooner or later, and decide whether the agency 
interpretation is (1) reasonable because it is the only permissible answer or is (2) 
reasonable because it is permissible but not required.  Under Brand X, as we have seen 
above, the two types of “reasonable” agency interpretations have very different legal 
consequences, so the determination whether the agency has offered one type of 
reasonable interpretation or the other cannot be postponed forever.  Of course that further 
determination need not be made in Case 1; it can be postponed to Case 2, or Case N.  But 
the only sensible question from the perspective of institutional design is which regime 
produces higher decision costs across the complete array of cases.  The objection rests on 
the erroneous premise that reasonableness is, under the current law, all judges have to 
decide.  Because the law requires them to go further, doctrinal Chevron has no advantage 
over the regime we suggest as far as decision costs are concerned.     
 
F.  Strategic Behavior  
Might Chevron as a voting rule create the opportunity for strategic voting or allow 
for judicial manipulation of outcomes in a way that doctrinal Chevron does not?   On 
balance, we think not, but there are several potential issues to consider.   
1. Circumvention through bargaining.  
A crass objection is that the voting rule might be easy to circumvent if judges are 
willing to trade votes across cases.   So long as judicial preferences in one case are more 
intense than in another case, the judge could implicitly or explicitly agree to change her 
vote in the low-intensity case in exchange for someone else’s vote in her high-intensity 
case; this is a bargain across cases, or a logroll.    
This is of course true, but it is no more true of supermajority voting rules than of 
majority voting rules.  If judges are willing to trade votes across cases, there is little that 
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either hard or soft deference doctrines can do about the matter.  Indeed, by raising the 
number of votes needed to change the status quo, the supermajority voting rule makes 
such trades somewhat more difficult, though not impossible. Additionally, if we are 
correct that interpretive questions under Chevron as a voting rule are less fuzzy than 
under the doctrinal inquiry, the costs of monitoring judges will be lower for the voting 
rule than the doctrine.  The voting rule framework demands that each judge state his 
beliefs as to the correct statutory interpretation.  Lies and deception remain possible.  But 
the cloaks of statutory ambiguity and second-order judgments about clarity and 
reasonableness are no longer available, in contrast to doctrinal Chevron.   
2. Insincere Voting.   
The question of explicit bargains is closely related to a more interesting objection, 
based on the possibility of insincere voting.87  A pocket of literature has focused on 
insincere or strategic voting on multi-member courts.88  The generic issues are numerous, 
but for our purposes, the question is only a comparative one. Does voting rule deference 
create opportunities for strategic or insincere voting in a way that the doctrinal deference 
framework does not?    
It is certainly possible that judges might manipulate their votes on sub-issues in a 
case, to garner or avoid a majority on the outcome.  For example, a judge who hopes to 
avoid a change in the law from one substantive rule to another could vote (insincerely) 
with another minority voting bloc to hold that the parties do not have standing, thereby 
avoiding a decision on the merits.89  But that manipulation is made harder, not easier, by 
a supermajority voting rule so long as the costs of assembling a supermajority on any 
given issue in a case are higher than the costs of assembling a simple majority.  
That point is subject to an important caveat, however. We must distinguish 
unintentional or unconscious bias from intentional manipulation.  As to the former, the 
shift from soft individual deference to hard aggregate deference entails risks that 
individual judges will continue to internalize deference norms.  If so, the system could 
produce double deference, whereby individual level deference would be amplified by the 
aggregate voting procedures. The possibility cannot be conceptually eliminated, but we 
think it relatively unlikely.  The case for aggregate-level deference supposes that judges 
tend more naturally towards correct interpretation than permissive interpretation.  Rather 
than fight this judicial tendency, our theory takes advantage of it.  Thus, while intentional 
manipulation is possible, unintentional manipulation that results from ordinary 
interpretive tendencies is less likely.   
                                                 
87 Cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:  Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 1309, 1375-76 (1995)  (discussing interaction between strategic voting, stare decisis, and insincere 
voting).  
88 See generally Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 2297 (1999); Colloquium:  Appellate Court Voting Rules, 49 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1996); Maxwell 
Stearns, Standing and Social Choice:  Historical Evidence,144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995); Maxwell 
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994).  
89 The issue has parallel application to questions of strategic voting and stare decisis.  See Michael 
Abromowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes:  The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1918-19 (2001). 
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As to intentional manipulation, Chevron as a voting rule is relatively easy to 
intentionally manipulate towards more deference, but much harder to manipulate towards 
less deference.  A dishonest judge who favors deference can  intentionally continue to 
apply internal deference to agencies, which result is  somewhat more deference than 
Chevron as a voting rule with sincere voting would produce.  And a dishonest judge who  
opposes deference can always vote against the agency in either the doctrinal framework 
or the voting rule framework.  However, the aggregate property of deference remains in 
the voting rule world, whereas it is lost entirely in the doctrinal world.  While injecting 
more deference is possible, undermining deference is much harder.  In general, while 
manipulation is of course possible under voting rule Chevron, there is no particular 
reason to think that it is systematically easier than under doctrinal Chevron with majority 
rule. 
3. Mixing Voting Rules.   
One additional pitfall relates to the mixing of supermajority rules and simple 
majority rules -- either horizontally, within a given case, or vertically, when lower court 
decisions are reviewed by higher courts.  We have illustrated the second concern with the 
case of single-member district courts above.  To illustrate the first concern, consider that 
a supermajority rule might govern whether an agency interpretation of a statute is lawful, 
but simple majority rule might govern the subsequent question of whether the agency’s 
action was arbitrary and capricious.  (We set aside the view that Step Two of Chevron 
and arbitrariness review are functionally identical.90)  Alternatively, a simple majority 
rule might determine the Chevron Step Zero inquiry, while a supermajority rule would 
determine whether to uphold the agency’s interpretation.   A perfectly sensible concern is 
that these sequencing issues allow for gaming in a way that doctrinal Chevron does not.   
 If a simple majority rule determines whether to apply the Chevron framework, 
and a supermajority rule determines the outcome of the Chevron analysis, then it is 
possible for a simple majority to vote against applying the deference framework if they 
thought it likely their preferred outcome would not be supported by a supermajority.  To 
be a bit more precise, if a majority of justices prefer to overturn the agency action, but a 
supermajority does not, then the simple majority can avoid the deference framework 
entirely at Chevron Step Zero.   
 Two points mitigate this effect.  First, this type of strategic behavior is not a 
problem if a simple majority wants to uphold the agency action.  In that case, a simple 
majority votes to apply the deference framework, and the agency action will be upheld 
because a supermajority of justices will not vote against the agency.  Second, if we take 
the question of whether to apply the deference framework to be guided by Mead, then 
avoiding the deference framework is not as easy as it first appears.  If the agency used 
formal rulemaking, formal adjudication, or informal rulemaking to produce its judgment, 
the action will usually qualify for Chevron deference. A majority could nonetheless vote 
against applying the deference framework, but in many cases that would be hard to 
square with the doctrinal framework.  If the agency fails to use one of the procedural 
                                                 
90 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994). 
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mechanisms favored by Mead, then it is admittedly far easier for a strategic majority to 
manipulate away from the deference framework.  But this is also precisely the regime we 
face now.  The voting rule does no better against this subtle form of manipulation, but it 
does not fare worse either.       
 The sequence of supermajority Chevron voting followed by simple majority 
voting on arbitrariness review  might produce similar anomalies.  We start with 
straightforward scenarios and turn to increasingly difficult ones for our framework.   
 (1) Suppose a supermajority of justices finds that the agency’s interpretation was 
wrong.  That is the end of the matter; the party challenging the agency’s action has ruled 
it out altogether as precluded by statute, a greater victory than an arbitrariness holding 
that would allow the agency a second chance to justify its decision.  No conflict with 
arbitrariness review results, because arbitrariness review is unnecessary.   
 (2) Suppose a supermajority of justices agrees with the agency’s interpretation.  If 
a majority of those justices also concludes that the agency’s action was not arbitrary and 
capricious, no anomaly results. What if a supermajority agrees with the agency’s 
statutory interpretation, but a simple majority also views the agency’s action as arbitrary 
and capricious?  A supermajority would think that agency’s action X authorized by 
statute, but a majority would think that the agency had not given adequate reasons for 
doing X, as opposed to Y or Z.   It is not obvious that there is any problem or anomaly 
here; the two views are perfectly consistent.  
 (3) Suppose a simple majority concludes the agency adopted the correct 
interpretation.  The agency decision would be authorized; again, it is a separate question 
whether a simple majority would also find that the agency adequately justified its 
decision in reasoned terms.  Whatever the simple majority concludes on that point, there 
is no inconsistency with the holding on statutory authorization.  
 (4) Lastly, suppose a simple majority concludes that the agency’s interpretation of 
the statute was incorrect.  The agency’s decision would stand because of the 
supermajority deference rule.  But in this case, it is possible that the same majority would 
also find the agency action arbitrary and capricious.  Since the two questions are 
conceptually distinct — one is about authority to take a given action, the other is about 
adequate justification for that action — here too it is not obvious that there is any 
problem.  To be sure, a strategic majority that loses on the statutory question by virtue of 
the supermajority rule might bend its views about arbitrariness to compensate.   So long 
as the analysis is sequential, a simple majority could undermine the aggregate deference 
rule.  However, under the current framework there is no limit on strategic or insincere 
voting during arbitrariness review either.  On a split panel, a single judge might vote 
insincerely on the statutory interpretation question to reach or avoid reaching the 
arbitrariness question.  Again, the Chevron voting rule does not better this situation, but it 
does not make it worse, and should not be solely charged with responsibility for a bad 
scenario that can arise under either the hard or the soft framework.  Furthermore, the bad 
scenario arises only in a limited subset of cases.  Hard and soft rules produce equivalent 
outcomes in scenarios (2) and (3).  Although we find scenario (4) unobjectionable, we see 
no particular reason to think that (4) constitutes the dominant scenario in the ordinary run 
of cases. Even if it did, that might be a reason not to oppose Chevron as a voting rule, but 
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instead to advocate a similar shift to a supermajority voting rule in the arbitrary and 
capricious setting, which itself is supposed to operationalize a deferential standard of 
review of agency policy judgments.   
All this could create incentives for administrative agencies as well.  As best we 
can discern, however, any incentive effects would simply mirror the existing incentive 
effects created by Mead.  If an agency wants to maximize the chance that Chevron 
deference will apply, Mead counsels the agency to use formal or informal rulemaking or 
formal adjudication — any process other than informal adjudication.  Voting rule 
Chevron does so as well, because (as explained above) our proposal does not affect the 
law of Chevron Step Zero.  The agency might be even more likely to use the procedures 
favored by Mead under the voting rule version of Chevron than under doctrinal Chevron, 
but only to the extent that there is greater certainty that deference will in fact result.       
 Similar dynamics could arise if reviewing courts utilize a simple majority rule 
while lower courts use a supermajority rule, or vice versa.  The issue can be cast in any 
number of ways, but perhaps the cleanest is to focus on Supreme Court review of three-
judge court of appeals panels.  Suppose the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit adopted 
a rule requiring a 3-0 vote to overturn an agency’s interpretation of a statute, but the 
Supreme Court used a simple majority rule to review the decision.  In this world, a simple 
majority of the Supreme Court could undermine the supermajority voting rule of the 
lower court.  Given the relatively low number of circuit judgments that are reviewed by 
the Court, this seems unlikely to be a major obstacle to implementation.  Alternatively, if 
the circuit adopted a supermajority rule and the Supreme Court adopted a supermajority 
rule, would we return to the double deference problem noted above?  No; the issue for the 
Supreme Court’s review is whether the Court should uphold or invalidate the agency’s 
action, not whether the circuit court properly deferred.  The Court owes no deference to 
lower courts on legal questions, and can apply the Chevron voting rule de novo.  That 
said, we do endorse the wholesale rather than piecemeal adoption of voting rule 
deference, at all levels of the judicial system.  Were reviewing courts to use voting rule 
deference while lower courts use doctrinal deference, the resulting analytic puzzles would 
be troublesome.   
 4. Litigant Effects.   
 Would voting rule deference change the incentives of regulated parties to seek 
judicial review?  Specifically, would certain challenges to agency action currently being 
brought not be filed in a voting rule deference regime, or is there a class of challenges 
currently not being filed, that would suddenly end up in court?  Ultimately, these are 
thorny empirical questions, but some rough speculation suggests any observed effects are 
likely to be modest, and, on net, beneficial.   
First, we are not advocating a shift from a no deference regime to a deference 
regime.  That transition would have significant effects, no doubt producing fewer 
challenges to agency actions or at least changing the mix of litigated cases.  The current 
debate is about shifting from one deference regime to another that is less costly and more 
effective, and in which the level of deference can be calibrated to be the same as in the 
doctrinal framework, if that is desirable.  For that reason, although some incentive effects 
on litigants are likely, it would be surprising if they were of enormous magnitude.   
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Second, to the extent that incentive effects would be produced, they are largely 
beneficial, and derive from the calibration and certainty analysis above. If voting rule 
deference results in more agency decisions being upheld, all else equal, we would expect 
a reduction in the number of challenges brought (initially) and an increase in the rate of 
settlement.  In and of itself, this effect is either neutral or positive.  If voting rule 
deference reduces uncertainty in the litigation lottery, then that also should encourage 
more settlement.  Agencies and regulated parties should be able to better predict judicial 
outcomes, and therefore settle the case in anticipation of those outcomes.  If the actual 
underlying probability of victory is held constant, then this reduction of uncertainty or 
noise in the judicial process, should economize on litigation costs and potentially save 
both litigant and agency resources.   
We take these effects to be virtually unqualified goods in and of themselves.  But 
there are potential negative side-effects.  For example, if regulated parties are able to 
better predict that they will lose a challenge to agency actions, they will be less likely to 
litigate, which might mean the agency would (ex ante) enact a more pro-agency rule.  
That is, we might observe a different realization of the underlying distribution of 
potential agency actions.  Given that the goal of Chevron deference is to give more policy 
making authority to agencies, this should not raise hackles; if it is undesirable, the voting 
rule can itself be adjusted. In light of the greater ability to calibrate and re-calibrate that 
the shift to voting rules produces, the incentive effects on litigants do not seem 
worrisome.   
G.  Deference and Politics  
 Even if it is correct that voting rule deference performs better than doctrinal 
deference in the various ways we have emphasized, might doctrinal deference create 
other positive externalities that voting rule deference would not?  To take a 
straightforward illustration, doctrinal Chevron asks judges to take seriously the views of 
coordinate branches.  In the process, maybe doctrinal deference generates positive norms 
of respect and appreciation for the views of other governmental units.  Even if such 
norms are normatively desirable, doctrinal deference seems an expensive way to 
accomplish the stated goal.  Moreover, it is far from obvious that voting rule Chevron 
would not produce more respect for coordinate branches.  Chevron’s theory of reasonable 
or permissible interpretation asks judges to vote to uphold agency interpretations that 
they believe wrong; this state of affairs could just as easily generate inter-branch hostility 
as mutual respect.   
 Above, we noted some mixed evidence suggesting that Chevron has increased 
deference overall, relative to the prexisting law, but that a large degree of ideological bias 
persists in the litigated cases.91  If limiting the effect of politics on case outcomes is the 
goal, then Chevron doctrine seems a blunt instrument for accomplishing that task.  We 
have suggested that Chevron as a voting rule will also constrain ideological and political 
bias in the law of deference, just at lower cost.  If this is so, then a concern about the 
political character of judging in administrative law supports the switch to Chevron as a 
voting rule.  Perhaps, on some normative views about political theory  it would be good if 
administrative law decisions ventilate  ideological disagreements.  All versions of 
                                                 
91 See Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?, supra note __.  
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Chevron assume away such a view, however, so such views do not supply a unique 
objection to our proposal.     
H.  Supply-side Issues  
 Even if one accepts all the foregoing, there is a separate issue about which  
institution(s) can or will supply the change we propose.  Is a transition from doctrine to 
voting rule simply infeasible, reducing our claim to a theoretically novel but practically 
irrelevant suggestion? In short, our view is that while obstacles to implementation are 
non-trivial, they are not at all insurmountable.  Contemporaneous practice and historical 
evidence demonstrate that voting rule solutions have been both proposed and adopted, 
sometimes by congressional mandate and sometimes by judicial fiat.  No feature of the 
Chevron context suggests implementation would be harder here than elsewhere, and there 
are significant reasons to think implementation would be far easier.  Whereas other 
proposals for supermajority voting rules have been associated with efforts to demand 
judicial deference against judicial wishes, Congress and the courts apparently agree that 
deference to agencies is a desirable goal.  There is therefore good reason to think judges 
would be less resistant to the imposition of Chevron as a voting rule by statute; perhaps 
judges might even adopt voting rule Chevron without a Congressional dictate.     
Before turning to these political concerns, however, we begin with the potential 
legal obstacles to supply of voting rule Chevron  by either Congress or the courts.  What 
of the constitutional, statutory, or doctrinal obstacles to the supply of the voting rule?  
Other scholars have addressed the parallel question whether courts or Congress could 
create a rule of deference to legislatures in constitutional adjudication.92  By comparison 
with that setting, there are few legal obstacles to the adoption of a supermajority voting 
rule for the merely statutory cases that Chevron governs.     
1. Judicial Supply.  
The least controversial means for a transition to voting rule Chevron would be for 
the judiciary to adopt the voting rule itself.  Whether or not a simple majority rule is a 
default for judicial institutions, there is nothing to prevent the Supreme Court from 
adopting an alternative rule. The Supreme Court already relies on nonmajority voting 
rules to grant certiorari and to hold cases.93  The lower courts routinely utilize variants of 
majority rule in decisions to grant en banc hearings. Several state supreme courts use 
supermajority votes to determine outcomes of state constitutional challenges to 
legislation, and the sky has apparently not fallen.94  And given that doctrinal Chevron is a 
doctrine of Supreme Court creation, it would clearly be preferable for the Supreme Court 
to spur the transition.    
Without Supreme Court intervention, the current doctrine likely prevents an 
individual circuit from shifting to voting rule deference.  The adoption of our proposed 
framework would be facially inconsistent with the current Chevron model.  Any hope for 
                                                 
92 Compare Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule, supra note __, with Caminker, Thayerian Deference, supra note 
__.    
93 See generally Revesz & Karlan, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067; Corday & Corday, 82 WASH. U.L.Q. 389 
(2004); Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (2002);  
Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986).  
94 Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule, supra note __, at 954-55.   
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judicial supply then rests primarily with the Supreme Court.  We know of no case in 
which the Court has adopted a voting rule approach to deference for itself or mandated 
that lower courts utilize one, although we have also emphasized that the Court does use 
voting-rule solutions, such as the Rule of Four, in other contexts.    
 Why does the Court generally eschew hard solutions to the deference problem?  
The answer cannot turn on the voting rule’s lack of feasibility, efficiency, or efficacy.  On 
all these fronts, Chevron as a voting rule  performs at least as well, and generally better, 
than doctrinal Chevron. A second obvious answer is that the courts are simply hostile to 
voting rules or hold some deep belief that voting rules are not a permissible part of the 
judicial tool set.  But this claim cannot be sustained against evidence of current judicial 
use of hard voting rules to address issues of internal judicial governance, such as en banc 
review and certiorari.  Moreover, the preference for simple majority voting rules is far 
from uniform in either Congress or the judiciary.  Without probing the judicial mind, we 
merely underline the inconsistency between a complete acceptance of hard solutions to 
deference questions for internal judicial matters and the apparent hostility to voting rule 
solutions when it comes to what might be called external deference.  On our view, 
whether the question is deference to precedent, deference to colleagues, deference to 
Congress, or deference to agencies, the underlying problems are the same.  Although the 
right solution will vary across settings, there is no categorical reason to disfavor hard 
solutions in general.   
2. Congressional Supply.   
If the Courts elect not to adopt Chevron as a voting rule , could Congress mandate 
the transition?  We think the answer is clearly yes.  Congressional authority to mandate 
supermajority voting rules has been analyzed most prominently in the context of 
Thayerian deference to legislative judgments of constitutionality, either generally or in a 
specific context like federalism.95 Various scholars have suggested that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and Article III provide Congress adequate means to require that statutes be 
overturned only by a supermajority.96 The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress 
the power to enact legislation for carrying into execution the judicial power, while Article 
III, sec. 2, cl. 2 gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction “with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”   The academic literature diverges sharply 
on the precise powers these clauses provide to Congress.97  Yet, short of a congressional 
attempt to direct the outcome of a specific case via voting rule, there is no strong 
argument that Congress could not mandate a supermajority rule of deference to agencies 
on questions of statutory interpretation. Enabling legislation has established quorum rules 
for the Supreme Court and lower courts, and has codified rules of evidence and procedure 
                                                 
95 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129 (1893).  For more recent discussions, see Thomas C. Grey, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 28 (1993); 
Presser, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 42 (1993); Mark Tushnet, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 9 (1993).  For recent discussions 
of the supermajority rule specifically see Caminker, supra note ____; Shugerman, supra note __.  
96 Shugerman, supra note ___, at 971-72. 
97 Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364, with Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power To 
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External 
Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 907.   
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for the federal courts;98 recent legislation has even precluded specific interpretations of 
statutes in live litigation, albeit with a general interpretive directive.99  So long as the 
regulation does not undermine the “essential functions” of the judiciary, Article III 
provides no constitutional bar.100  Does the supermajority rule run afoul of some 
unspecified simple majority rule default in the Constitution?101  The Constitution, 
Congress, and the courts themselves utilize a range of submajority and supermajority 
rules.  No voting rule has obvious default status, especially for judicial voting   
 Perhaps the simplest argument is that congressional power to mandate voting rule 
Chevron is “necessary and proper”102 to the execution of other legislative powers, 
because a better deference framework could allow Congress to delegate to agencies at 
lower cost, and with greater precision and confidence.103  Either a global deference 
statute—requiring voting rule Chevron in all cases of agency decisions—or a specific 
voting rule in an agency’s organic statute would comport with separation of powers 
principles.104 A Chevron voting rule would be akin to other interpretive directives that 
Congress might lawfully generate,105 and the important point is that there is no inherent 
constitutional problem with such statutes.  Congress not only has the power to enact 
legislation necessary and proper to executing other legislative powers, but also judicial 
powers.  Congress generally may not lawfully direct the outcome of a specific case,106 or 
reopen a specific judgment,107 but it is not controversial that (as necessary and proper) 
Congress may determine the number of Justices and judges, set quorum rules for the 
courts, mandate the use of certain rules of evidence and procedure.108  A voting rule 
statute would be similar in form and function to rules of evidence, procedure, or other 
potential interpretive statutes.   
  Whatever Congress’s general powers to direct voting rules for the federal 
judiciary, and we think they are substantial, the argument is all the stronger in the context 
of statutory and administrative law. With respect to judicial review of agency actions, 
Congress may preclude agency actions from judicial review altogether,109 at least to the 
extent that the challenge does not raise constitutional claims,110 restrict the venue and 
timing of judicial review of agency action, and specify the legal standard by which courts 
will review agency action. Against this backdrop, it would be extremely awkward to 
                                                 
98 Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule, supra note __.   
99 See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004, 117 Stat. 1263.  
100 Hart, Power of Congress, supra note __.  
101 See generally Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule, supra note ___, at 988.   
102 U.S. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 18. 
103 See Nicholas Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2102-03 
(2002).   
104 See Rosenkrantz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, supra note __, (discussing constitutional 
objections to legislating interpretive rules).   
105 Id.  
106 Consider United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).  
107 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
108 See Fed. Rules Evid.; Fed Rules Civ. Pro.  See also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (upholding 
automatic stay provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act). 
109 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). 
110 See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Czerkies v. Dept. Of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435 (7th Cir. 
1995) (en banc).  
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argue that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from directing a specific voting rule be 
used in review of agency actions.  If Chevron were a constitutional doctrine, then there 
might be a sensible argument that Congress does not have plenary control. Yet so long as 
the court adheres to the view that Chevron’s foundation is congressional intent, it is all 
but inevitable that Congress is free to modify or eliminate Chevron deference via a 
general statute.111  The Supreme Court has given absolutely no indication that a statute 
could not rebut the presumption of deference, mandating, for example, that courts review 
agency decisions de novo.   We have already voiced our skepticism about this foundation 
for Chevron, but so long as the legal fiction is taken seriously, Congress is free to modify 
the scope, nature, intensity, and as we argue, operative methods of the Chevron deference 
framework.  If Chevron is a creation of fictitious implicit Congressional intent, we are 
hard pressed to see why it may not be modified by express Congressional directive.      
 This is just to say that congressional supply is legally permissible; it is a separate 
question whether it is likely.  In general, Congress has proven almost completely mute 
about  when courts should defer to administrative agencies.  This may show that the 
Supreme Court accurately selected the majoritarian default rule in Chevron:  statutory 
silence evidences congressional satisfaction with the current soft deference framework.  
Of course, congressional silence pre-Chevron could just as convincingly be taken to have 
signaled support for the rather different pre-1984 deference regime. Current 
congressional silence no more demonstrates satisfaction with the Chevron doctrine than 
did congressional silence before 1984 demonstrate congressional satisfaction with the 
lack of a Chevron doctrine.  One possibility is that the issue of deference simply lacks 
political salience with constituents and therefore  also lacks payoffs for legislators.112  If 
so, Congress is unlikely to adopt our proposal; but the judicial route remains, and 
congressional passivity means that a legislative override of a judicially adopted change 
would itself be unlikely.     
 Additionally, it is worth emphasizing that our proposal does not suffer from one 
of the principal defects of other proposals to implement supermajority voting rules in the 
courts.  Our proposal is not tied to any congressional efforts to reduce judicial power or 
strip jurisdiction.113  Nor is it related to a contested institutional fight about if and when 
courts should show deference to executive or legislative judgments on any particular 
policy or in particular, hotly controversial areas.114  While the Chevron doctrine has 
received its fair share of criticism in the commentary, and peripheral questions about 
scope and intensity of review remain, the core doctrine of Chevron deference is now 
almost universally embraced by Congress, courts, and agencies.  In this sense, our task is 
quite different from that of those who, say, urge that Congress foist a supermajority 
                                                 
111 Garrett, Legislating Chevron, supra note __. 
112 If true, this fact is disquieting for public choice scholars of the bureaucracy and Congress.  The existence 
and nature of judicial review should make delegation to agencies significantly more or less attractive to 
legislators and regulated private parties.  See generally David EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, 
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voting rule on the Supreme Court in any case involving federalism doctrine.  We do not 
pretend that the proposal would face no judicial resistance, but we think the nature of 
resistance would be fundamentally different, and its intensity much lower, simply 
because the judiciary already holds the view that deference is appropriate.   
  
CONCLUSION 
 The Chevron doctrine is a pillar of modern administrative law, and we embrace 
the doctrine’s fundamental premises.  On most questions of law, policy, and fact, Article 
III courts should defer to the judgment of administrative agencies.  Although we believe 
the best rationale for the Chevron doctrine is different from the rationale favored by the 
current Court, our proposal is agnostic on this front. Independent of one’s view of 
Chevron’s proper foundation, most everyone agrees that deference to administrative 
agencies is desirable.   Given that goal, a voting rule deference framework is either as 
good as or better than a doctrinal deference framework on virtually every dimension of 
comparison.      
 Rather than impose upon judges the awkward task of developing and executing a 
second-order theory of permissible interpretation, the voting rule approach asks judges to 
do what they do best:  identify the best interpretation of a statute.  This shift reduces the 
conceptual, psychological and motivational burdens that the Chevron doctrine places on 
judges.  Such burdens are not just benign academic quandaries.  They result in confusion 
and uncertainty about the manner in which deference will be applied.  Such confusion is 
costly in its own right, but it also helps mask other potential biases in judicial decisions.   
 Chevron as a voting rule avoids these problems by making deference an aggregate 
rather than individual feature of judicial review.  Combined with the far more powerful 
ability to calibrate deference levels, our analysis suggests the hard voting rule is a 
superior solution to the problem of institutional deference.  Although we do not minimize 
the challenges of implementation, none seems sufficiently powerful that we should ignore 
the benefits from switching to Chevron as a voting rule.  
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